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This thesis examines the conflict between contradictory
but coexisting American views of Japan's roles in U.S.
national security strategy: strategic ally and economic
adversary. Its central hypothesis is that postwar American
policy toward Japan has, of necessity, placed strategic
imperatives over economic interests but that a continuation
of such an approach in the emerging post-Cold War environ-
ment both harms U.S. interests and risks a breakdown in
U.S. -Japan relations. The thesis assesses the rationales
for a continued strategic emphasis in the relationship and
an alternative economic emphasis. It concludes with a set
of policy recommendations aimed at shifting the relative
emphasis placed on the two sets of interests by maintaining
but downgrading the strategic relationship, including the
security alliance, while increasing the priority given to
U.S. economic and competitiveness interests. The ultimate
goal is to establish a more stable and enduring U.S. -Japan
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The U.S. -Japan alliance has been characterized as the
most important bilateral relationship in the world. 1 The
two nations are each others largest overseas trading part-
ners. Japan is the second largest foreign direct investor
in the United States and, during the 1980s, has been the
most important foreign buyer of U.S. government securities.
The United States is by far Japan's largest export market as
well as its major source of direct investment and imports.
The two countries are the world's largest foreign aid
donors, the most substantial contributors to United Nations
organizations, and are among the most influential members of
the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the
Asian Development Bank. 2 Together they account for about 40
percent of global gross national product (GNP). 3 In fact:
With just 7 percent of the world's population, the two
economies produce 30 percent of the world's goods and con-
trol a similarly disproportionate percentage of global
trade. Together the two countries account for nearly
three-quarters of world stock and bond market value and
half of all bank lending. They issue 80 percent of the
money used by other nations as reserve currencies. 4
The significance of this massive, globally dominant economic
relationship is exceeded only by an unprecedented security
arrangement
.
For forty-six years, American military forces have been
stationed in Japan and the two countries are bound by a
forty year old bilateral security alliance. Unlike
America's other major front-line Cold War military alliance,
the multilateral NATO pact, the U.S. -Japan security rela-
tionship is asymmetrical in its implicit obi igat ions--
creating the ironic arrangement in which the world's richest
nation has virtually guaranteed the security of the second
richest without any reciprocal commitment. Beyond the
alliance itself, the security relationship is characterized
by such significant interdependencies as the reliance of
U.S. high technology military equipment on Japanese elec-
tronic components as well as the fact that many of Japan's
major weapons systems are coproduced American models.
But despite the scope and depth of the U.S. -Japan
alliance, the relationship is threatened by divisive econo-
mic imbalances and political tensions. These tensions and
the potential instability they engender reflect the unique
evolution of U.S. -Japan relations in the postwar period.
Indeed, the complex, interdependent relationship which has
evolved is frequently riven by mutual suspicion and mis-
understanding and, on the American side, by conflicting and
seemingly irreconcilable, but thus far coexisting, views of
Japan's place in U.S. national security strategy:
strategic ally and economic adversary. This contradiction
is further intensified by the shift toward a post-Cold War
international security environment which increases the
ambiguity of Japan's contribution to mutual strategic
interests, especially when balanced against a growing
contention that national economic imperatives are now of
greater strategic importance than military security
considerations
.
Implicit in this main issue of the appropriate strategic
balance in the U.S. -Japan relationship, and indicative of
the ambiguities noted above, are the following interrelated
questions
:
First, is it in U.S. interest to continue subordinating
economic priorities to security considerations in its rela-
tions with Japan, our primary international economic com-
petitor? Indeed, can these two areas of American national
interest any longer be assessed separately?
Second, as the Soviet threat diminishes is it in U.S.
interest to continue encouraging Japanese rearmament
(qualitative or quantitative) even as the United States is
being looked to as a "watchdog" of Japan's potential
military power?
Third, is it consistent with the emerging American
"regional balancer" role in the Asia-Pacific area to become
dependent on Japan as the "critical linchpin of U.S. stra-
tegy in the Pacific" when most other regional actors view
Japan as a threat?
Fourth, is it in U.S. interest to encourage Japan to
assume a larger, more assertive and even more independent
regional and global role as an offset to or sharer of
America's international security, economic and political
burdens when there is no clear evidence that Japan shares
U.S. world order goals or will consistently exercise such a
role in parallel with American interests?
As these questions illustrate, the increasing polariza-
tion of American views of Japan raises troubling issues for
this contentious but clearly important bilateral relation-
ship. Any effort to establish a more stable, enduring and
genuinely reciprocal post-Cold War partnership between Japan
and the United States will require substantial reconcilia-
tion of the contradictions posed above. An examination of
the historical causes, competing American interests, and
U.S. policy options relevant to such an effort is a
necessary first step towards achieving this worthwhile,
even vital, goal.
A. THE RESEARCH PROBLEM: HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
Following the surrender of Japan in August 1945, the
United States moved rapidly to dominate Japan's postwar
occupation. This dominance allowed the U.S. to pursue broad
policy objectives which included the assurance "...that
Japan will not again become a menace to the United States or
to the peace and security of the world" as well as "the
establishment of a peaceful and responsible government which
will respect the rights of other states and will support the
objectives of the United States...." 5 In accordance with
the Cairo, Yalta and Potsdam declarations of the allied
powers, these objectives would be achieved primarily by
stripping Tokyo of its colonial possessions, by Japan's
complete disarmament and demilitarization, by encouraging
the Japanese people to form democratic and representative
organizations, and by radically restructuring Japan's
economic system. 6 Operating "on the premise that Japan was
the principal, if not the only, threat to the tranquility of
the Far East," American postwar planners sought to turn the




However, with the onset of the Cold War in the late
1940s, the aims of U.S. postwar policy toward Japan were
fundamentally altered. Shifting away from goals of
permanent disarmament and radical economic restructuring,
the U.S. sought to reconstruct Japan to create, within its
larger containment strategy, "a regional bulwark against
Soviet encroachment" in East Asia. 8 A non-communist Japan,
tied closely to the free world, seemed especially important
in the aftermath of the "loss of China" and the communist
invasion of South Korea. Indeed, according to National
Intelligence Estimate 43 of November 1951 "...under
Communist control Japan would pose the greatest threat to
the U.S. position in the Western Pacific." 9
In committing itself to Japan's economic recovery and
military security, the U.S. established a long-term
relationship with Japan that became formalized within the
framework of the U.S. -Japan Mutual Security Treaties of 1951
and 1960. This and other Cold War security commitments,
according to some authors, established "a 40-year behavior
pattern in which the United States has sacrificed its
economic interests for what it regarded as military
imperatives." 10 While the U.S. recognized "the necessity of
assuming [responsibility for] the military defense of Japan
so long as that is required," 11 the Japanese were expected,
through the mid-1960s, "to play no more than a passive role
in the American strategy of containing communism [by] merely
providing bases [for U.S. forces]..., and securing ...[ them-
selves] against internal subversion." 12
Japan's dependence on the U.S. during this early period
of the postwar relationship was extended into the economic
arena in the form of American technology assistance and
trade concessions as well as preferential procurement
policies (e.g., during the Korean War). However, by the
late 1960s, the rapid pace of Japanese economic recovery
coupled with the growing costs of America's Vietnam commit-
ment led to a fundamental shift in U.S. policy toward Japan.
Within the context of the broader Nixon Doctrine of
1969, the "U.S. urged Japan to build-up its [armed] forces"
and assume greater responsibility for its own defense. 13
Indeed, by early 1970 American officials were characterizing
the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (SDF) as being "responsible
for [even if not fully capable of] their country's immediate
conventional defense." 14 Meanwhile, persistent U.S. trade
deficits with Japan since the mid-1960s led American
policy-makers to publicly call for an end to "the era. .
.
during which Japan could claim special [economic]
privileges . M1
5
While the United States had recognized for some time the
necessity to "guard against a flooding of our own markets by
[Japanese] goods," 16 U.S. -Japan trade issues of the late
1960s marked a departure in bilateral relations. Through
the mid-sixties, Japanese economic recovery had been viewed
as "the heart of any collective effort to defend the Far
East against aggression." 17 In other words, Japanese
economic growth served U.S. security interests first by
creating the political and social stability which reduced
Japan's vulnerability to communist subversion, and later by
contributing to accelerated development elsewhere in non-
communist Asia. But, once Japanese growth began proceeding
at U.S. expense (in the form of trade deficits beginning in
1965), American views began to shift.
Thus, by the late 1960s, U.S. views of Japan began to
diverge significantly in both the defense and economic
spheres. In the military relationship Tokyo, while still
seen to be an ally, was also viewed increasingly as a "free
rider" which failed satisfactorily to share defense bur-
dens. 18 Economic relations continued to be perceived not
only in terms of a partnership, especially with respect to
Asian development, but also as an unbalanced competitive
relationship lacking in reciprocity on the Japanese side
(now referred to by some as "neomercantilism" 19 ). But
defense and economic "one-sidedness" were not entirely
separate issues--both stemmed from the assertion that Japan
continued to derive major benefits from its military and
economic dependence on the U.S., while failing to
reciprocate by accepting a share of the costs that its
economic recovery made it quite capable of assuming.
Over the past two decades of extensive U.S. -Japan rela-
tions these conflicting views--ally/partner versus free
rider/unfair compet i tor--have not been resolved; in fact,
there has developed an intensifying polarity between them.
The essential result has been a deepening contradiction
between American views, and even policies, toward Japan.
One set of views places Tokyo in a role of critical
strategic partner in the pursuit of U.S. regional and global
goals, while others consider Japan to be primarily an
economic adversary which contributes to American aims only
under pressure and criticism or when those aims clearly
serve Japan's own narrowly focused economic purposes.
For a number of reasons the U.S. government has
downplayed the potential divisiveness of this fundamental
ambiguity in American- Japanese relations. Post-Vietnam
retrenchment in Asia followed by the need to counter an
8
increasingly active Soviet threat necessitated continued
harmony in U.S. -Japan defense relations, both to promote
burden sharing and to retain base access in Japan. Growing
U.S. dependence on Japanese technology and investment capi-
tal as well as continued American commitment to the
international free trade regime produced an economic policy
toward Japan which has stressed incremental negotiation
rather than decisive or comprehensive retaliation for
Japan's "unfair" practices. Finally, the costs of U.S.
global commitments, both military and foreign aid related,
in a period of growing domestic fiscal constraints have led
American policy-makers to engage Japan in a widening global
partnership aimed at sharing burdens and responsibilities in
pursuit of mutual interests. This partnership has
emphasized in particular larger Japanese foreign aid
expenditures, a more visible role in key international
organizations, greater host-nation support to U.S. forces
in Japan, and improved military capabilities in support of
wider SDF missions.
During a period of persistent, significant Soviet
threats to U.S. national security, this approach to U.S.-
Japan relations was both prudent and most effective in
serving American interests despite its apparent costs.
These costs have included significant imbalances, favorable
to Japan, in military expenditures, in political risks and
in economic transactions.
However, as the Soviet threat to U.S. security interests
recedes and there emerges "an entirely new concept of
national secur i ty ...[ which ] embraces economics and competi-
tive, commercial relations," 20 the underlying contradictory
aspects of U.S. -Japan relations are further highlighted.
Indeed, common American- Japanese strategic interests appear
to be diminishing even as the potential for intense economic
competition appears to be increasing. Clearly, the emerging
post-Cold War international environment offers the oppor-
tunity for a fundamental reassessment of Japan's place in
U.S. national security strategy. Failure to do so risks
further confusion as to the net benefits to U.S. interests
of the current relationship and, ultimately, a mutually dis-
advantageous breakdown in U.S. -Japan relations may result.
B. THE RESEARCH PROBLEM: HYPOTHESIS AND METHODOLOGY
The purpose of this research is to conduct an assessment
of post-Cold War American strategic and economic interests
vis-a-vis Japan and to examine the implications of that
assessment for U.S. policy. The analytic approach under-
taken in this study is based on the hypothesis that Japan's
strategic relationship with the United States has heretofore
reflected Cold War imperatives. In the American view,
Japanese security cooperation and economic strength were
considered to be indispensable elements of containment
strategy, and justified the subordination of U.S. economic
10
interests to security imperatives. In Japan's view, the
only realistic course in a bipolar world was to accept
American security and economic patronage as a means to
facilitate its postwar recovery. The very success of these
aims has produced conflicting American views of Japan's role
in U.S. national security strategy (strategic ally/partner
versus economic adversary/free rider). The shift toward a
post-Cold War international order, symbolized by the
dismantling of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, is
seriously challenging the strategic assumptions underlying
the U . S . -Japanese relationship. This clouding of strategic
interests will only intensify the contradictions in American
views of Japan's role in U.S. strategy.
Failure to reconcile these contradictory views threatens
to produce an increasingly unstable bilateral relationship
which fails to best serve U.S. interests and which risks
mutually disadvantageous breakdown. Furthermore, if recon-
ciliation of these contradictions cannot be accomplished by
seeking changes in Japan's behavior, then the U.S. must
change its own. Such change must begin with a fundamental
reassessment of U.S. interests and policies aimed at miti-
gating the divisive American views of Japan and achieving a
more stable, balanced and enduring relationship.
The methodological approach to be employed in this study
is summarized below:
11
1. Develop an historical model of the postwar evolution
of U.S. -Japan relations to demonstrate how Cold War
security imperatives and growing economic competition
created an intensifying contradiction between American
views of Japan as a strategic ally/partner and an eco-
nomic adversary/ free rider;
2. Examine the current contradiction in the relationship
to demonstrate its inherent potential for instability
under changing international strategic conditions
(i.e., the end of the Cold War);
3. Assess rationales supporting the continued predomi-
nance of a strategic alliance emphasis in U.S. -Japan
relat ions
;
4. Assess rationales supporting a predominant emphasis on
American economic interests in U.S. -Japan relations;
and
5. Based on the assessment of American interests con-
ducted above, provide policy recommendations for
establishing a more stable, less divisive relationship
which may better serve those interests.
C. RESEARCH ASSUMPTIONS/LIMITATIONS
This research will be guided by the following assump-
tions :
First, during the Cold War era, the U.S. government sub-
ordinated national economic interests to global strategic
imperatives in its relationship with Japan and this policy
approach generally continues today.
Second, despite the diminishing Soviet threat, the U.S.
will maintain a forward deployed military presence in the
Pacific and elsewhere, albeit at reduced levels, rather than
adopt a neo-isolationist strategy, and, for the foreseeable
future, the United States will be viewed by most
12
Asia-Pacific actors as the only acceptable "benign hege-
monist" for the region.
Third, the end of the Cold War between the U.S. and the
Soviet Union has produced a shift in American strategic
focus in the Asia-Pacific region from Soviet containment to
a "regional balancer" role (this study will use the
"regional balancer" strategy, rather than some proposed
alternative, to assess the strategic value of the U.S. -Japan
alliance and Japan's role in American strategy).
Fourth, the trade balance, industrial competitiveness
and economic sovereignty will continue to be potent politi-
cal issues in the U.S., and Japan will remain the main
foreign target of American criticism in this regard (domes-
tic causes of and solutions to U.S. economic problems are
not a focus of the analysis; but, this should not be inter-
preted as a dismissal of their legitimacy or importance).
Fifth, underlying domestic and regional developments
(positive as well as negative) impacting on Japan's security
strategy and international role will continue to shape its
policies and limit its ability to change policy directions
except at its own measured pace. This reluctance to change
also applies to economic matters as Japan's successful stra-
tegy has led many Japanese to adopt the attitude that they
have nothing further to gain at this time from the West and
indeed that the opposite is the case 21 (for this reason the
study focuses on U.S. interests and policy options, and
13
assumes that an American approach which counts on rapid,
meaningful Japanese change, even under swiftly evolving
international conditions or persistent U.S. pressure, will
not succeed ) .
14
II. EVOLVING AMERICAN PERCEPTIONS
OF JAPAN'S ROLE IN POSTWAR U.S. STRATEGY
A. JAPAN: "THE VANQUISHED" (1945-1948)
In proclaiming its "unconditional surrender to the
Allied Powers," the Japanese government submitted itself "to
carry out the provisions of the Potsdam Declaration..., and
to issue whatever orders and take whatever action may be
required by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers
[SCAP] or by any other designated [Allied] representa-
tive." 22 In effect, the vanquished nation yielded its des-
tiny to occupation authorities. For all practical purposes,
this equated to American control of Japan's future. Despite
the token participation of non-U. S. occupation forces as
well as the formation of Allied organizations to formulate,
implement and monitor occupation policies, they exercised
little real power in the face of effective American domi-
nance of Japan's postwar administration. 23
This domination of both policy-making and the means to
implement it supported, but by no means guaranteed, the
attainment of America's broad goal of insuring "that Japan
will not again become a menace to the United States or to
the peace and security of the world." 24 A specific course
of action was required to translate the basic Potsdam ideals
15
of demilitarization and democratization into reality. Two
contending approaches emerged.
One approach, advocated by the so-called 'China Crowd,'
favored a "punitive peace, laying emphasis on the reform of
Japan, not its recovery." 25 Specifically:
They proposed that most of the existing political and eco-
nomic structure should be dismantled, which would slow up
Japan's post-war progress to China's advantage and prepare
the nation for recasting in a more acceptable mould. In
particular, the Emperor system, the principal symbol of
feudal prestige and unrepresentative power, should be abo-
lished and the stranglehold of the zaibatsu on industry
broken, as necessary preliminaries to the foundation of a
peaceful democracy. 26
A more tolerant approach favored by the 'Japan Crowd,'
led by former Ambassador to Japan Joseph Grew, "...freely
acknowledged the need to rid Japan of militarism. The
difference was that the Japan Crowd had more faith in
Japan's capacity to reform herself." 27 They advocated
social stability and economic recovery. Political reform
would be imposed but would be encouraged by nurturing the
pro-western tendencies of those liberal elements which had
been stifled by the rise of militarism. Significantly, they
favored retaining the Imperial institution and preserving
Japan's cultural heritage. 28
While initial policy reflected elements of both
approaches, the rise of a number of China crowd members to
key State Department and occupation positions in the early
post-war period produced a fairly activist occupation plan.
Although the Emperor was to be retained, at least
16
temporarily, and the Allied Powers were not to "impose upon
Japan any form of government not supported by the freely
expressed will of the people," 29 the main thrust of initial
U.S. post-surrender policy for Japan clearly reflected China
crowd thinking. Total disarmament and demilitarization
would be accompanied by an extensive purge. Civil liberties
and democratic processes would be encouraged, if not simply
imposed. Military industrial potential was to be converted
to civilian uses, transferred abroad or scrapped, and large
industrial and banking combinations ( zaibatsu) dissolved.
The Allies were not to undertake the burden of repairing war
damage and were "not [to] assume any responsibility for the
economic rehabilitation of Japan or the strengthening of the
Japanese economy." 30 Finally, reparations would be exacted
to compensate the Allies for war damage.
In practice, however, the implementation of occupation
policy reflected the "highly personal stamp" of its Supreme
Commander, General Douglas MacArthur, who sought to "lead a
'spiritual reformation' that would bring democratic and
Christian values to Japan." 31 As a consequence, "Washing-
ton's influence was uncertain, filtered through MacArthur'
s
personality and the SCAP hierarchy, while that of the
nations that had aided in the war against Japan was vir-
tually non-existent." 32 MacArthur embarked on his mission
with zeal. He rapidly demobilized and destroyed the
Japanese war machine, initiated a sweeping (though not
17
altogether thorough) purge of former Japanese militarists
and their supporters, and instituted significant educa-
t ional, labor and land reforms. He deftly orchestrated the
promulgation of a new liberal democratic constitution, which
included a clause eliminating Japan's armed forces and
denouncing war as the sovereign right of a nation. He also
retained but downgraded the status of the Emperor, began
dismantling the zai batsu, and legalized independent politi-
cal parties and labor unions. Certain of the reforms were
to prove deep and enduring, others superficial, and some
largely unsuccessful.
Among the failures appeared to be SCAP's economic
program. By 1947:
The practical difficulties involved in dismantling the
zaibat su networks were already making themselves felt.
But more urgently, the Japanese economy had totally failed
to recover from the ravages of war. On the contrary,
inflation had soared wildly and the food situation was one
of permanent crisis.... America faced the prospect of
staving off Japan's financial ruin indefinitely through
emergency aid, with no return on the investment--a burden




With the visibility and activity of Japanese communists
growing as the result of labor and political liberalization,
Washington became concerned that Japan's economic weakness,
potential political instability and lack of an effective
civil police force made it vulnerable to communist-inspired
subversion. Contemporary events in Eastern Europe and
elsewhere in Asia only reinforced this concern. Still,
18
MacArthur pressed for an early peace treaty to end the
occupation, possibly coupled with a complete demilitariza-
tion agreement under international guarantees for Japan's
security and neutrality. 34
However, in October 1947 George F. Kennan's Policy
Planning Staff ( PPS ) at the State Department foresaw "great
risks in an early relinquishment of Allied control over
Japan." 35 Specifically, they warned "if Japan is not poli-
tically and economically stable when the peace treaty is
signed, it will be difficult to prevent communist penetra-
tion." 36 A year later, in a National Security Council (NSC)
report, Washington's position shifted even more markedly
away from an early treaty. Emphasizing recovery, stability
and security over reform, NSC 13/2 recommended that "...in
view of the serious international situation created by the
Soviet Union's policy of aggressive Communist expansion,
this Government should not press for a treaty of peace at
this time." 37 Regarding political aspects of the occupa-
tion, the report recommended that "responsibility should be
placed to an increasing degree in the hands of the Japanese
Government" and "that emphasis should be given to Japanese
assimilation of the reform programs." 38 More specifically,
no further reform legislation should be pressed on the
Japanese and pressures for implementation of on-going
reforms should be relaxed. Furthermore, the purge was to be
brought to an end.
19
On security matters, NSC 13/2 called for the retention
of U.S. forces in Japan at least until a peace treaty was
effected. However, it deferred consideration of post-treaty
security arrangements, preferring to base those requirements
on the international situation and internal Japanese
security conditions prevailing at the time of treaty
negotiations. Meanwhile, "the Japanese Police establish-
ment, including the coastal patrol, should be strengthened
by the re-enforcing and re-equipping of the present
forces . . . .
"
3 9
Finally, the report recommended that "second only to
U.S. security interests, economic recovery should be made
the primary objective of United States policy in Japan for
the coming period." 40 This goal was to be pursued through a
"combination of United States aid... on a declining scale
over a number of years, and by a vigorous and concerted
effort... to cut away existing obstacles to the revival of
Japanese foreign trade... to facilitate restoration and
development of Japan's exports." 41 In support of this,
reparations would be scaled back and further efforts to
reform the zaibatsu industrial/financial combines were to be
abandoned.
The basic shift of policy implied in NSC 13/2 repre-
sented the first fundamental change in U.S. views of Japan's
place in postwar American strategy. From the "vanquished"
enemy subject to reform and military-industrial containment,
20
Japan came to be viewed as the "dependent" ally whose
recovery would make it the anchor of the U.S. security
perimeter in East Asia.
B. JAPAN: "THE DEPENDENT" (1949-1969)
As Cold War tensions mounted, the recommendations of NSC
13/2 were largely adopted and the United States incorporated
Japan into its "defensive perimeter" against Communist
expansion in Asia. 42 Indeed, according to then Secretary of
State Dean Acheson, "...were Japan added to the Communist
bloc, the Soviets would acquire skilled manpower and indus-
trial potential capable of significantly altering the
balance of world power." 43 Based on the theory of Moscow-
inspired international communist expansion, events in China
and Korea seemed only to reinforce the perceived danger to
Japan. In response to this growing threat, the U.S.
committed itself not only to Japan's economic rehabilitation
but also to "the necessity of assuming the military defense
of Japan so long as that is required, both in the interest
of our security and in the interests of the security of the
entire Pacific area." 44
As reflected in NSC 48/5 of May 1951, U.S. aims toward
Japan, both then and in the post-treaty period, were to be:
1) to "assist Japan to develop a sound economy," 2) to
"speed the building of military defenses," and 3) to
"establish long-term relationships between the United States
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and Japan which will contribute to the security of the
United States." The accomplishment of these goals would
provide for "the maximum deterrent to the Kremlin in the
post-treaty period [by creat ing ] . . . a Japan with a rapidly
and soundly developing economy, internal political
stability, and an adequate military capability for
self-defense." 45 Indeed, according to an earlier military
staff study, "an economically strong, friendly and Western
oriented Japan would be of [such] great value to the United
States" that the only alternative, should the U.S. "decide
not to protect Japan," would be to deny any potential Soviet
gain "by seeking the closest approximation possible to a
depopulated and devastated Japan." 46 The latter option was
considered "illogical" and was rejected.
In light of Japan's fragile economic position and acute
military vulnerability, American analysts recognized that
Tokyo would continue to depend on "U.S. provided military
protection and economic support" for some time after the
occupation period ended. While it was recognized that
"Japan has sufficient manpower and industrial facilities to
enable it, within a few years, to assume a large and growing
share of its own military defense," it was also understood
that "progress would be impeded by widespread war weariness,
fears of a resurgence of militarism, and concern over eco-
nomic hardships" as well as the legal obstacle presented by
Article Nine of the Japanese constitution. 47 The latter,
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American imposed impediment, would become a source of
frustration to U.S. policy-makers in subsequent years.
The U.S. -Japan Security Treaty of 1951 formalized an
arrangement by which Japan, recognizing its lack of "the
effective means to exercise its inherent right of self-
defense," would depend on U.S. forces based "in and about
Japan... to contribute to the maintenance of international
peace and security in the Far East and to the security of
Japan against armed attack from without...." Japan
committed itself to little more than maintaining domestic
order and even then recognized the potential need to request
U.S. assistance "to put down largescale internal riots and
disturbances in Japan, caused through the instigation or
intervention by any outside Power or Powers." 48
For the Japanese, the acceptance of U.S. security
guarantees and associated military presence in Japan, though
not without controversy, appeared to be the best compromise
between the extremes of a vulnerable neutrality and an even
more unlikely independent rearmament. In view of Japan's
postwar economic dependence on the U.S., its international
status as a "defeated" and therefore untrustworthy nation,
and the polarization of the Cold War world, the Japanese
probably had little real choice but to align themselves with
the United States. Acceptance of U.S. patronage and
security guarantees actually worked to Japan's advantage,
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allowing it to concentrate resources on economic rather
military recovery.
More than any other single event, the Korean War marked
the beginning of Japan's postwar recovery. The war led to
the creation, at American insistence, of the National Police
Reserve (NPR) in July 1950-- forerunner of the Japanese Self-
defense Forces (JSDF). While responsible for no more than
internal security, the NPR represented the first significant
step toward rearmament. The war also proved to be an
economic boon for Japan as a result of preferential U.S.
procurement policies which pumped approximately $30 million
a month into the Japanese economy between July 1950 and
February 1952. 49
American interest in Tokyo's economic recovery took
other forms as well. Concern over Japan's need for access
to Southeast Asian raw materials and markets contributed to
U.S. involvement in Indochina during the 1950s. In Japan
itself, the U.S. provided about $2 billion dollars worth of
various types of economic aid between 1946 and 1956. 50
Tokyo also benefitted from its partnership in American aid
programs, supplying "more than $450 million worth of
commodities and equipment to ICA [the U.S. International
Cooperation Administration] programs..." in Asia between
1954 and 1958. 51 The United States government also
tolerated Japanese barriers to American imports while
arguing against restrictions on Japan's growing low-cost
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exports to the U.S. In the view of American leaders, "Japan
must export to live" and the denial of "free-world outlets
for her products" would compel Japan "to become dependent as
a last resort upon the Communist empire." 52 Finally, to
boost the economic recovery of Japan and other vulnerable
free-world nations, U.S. firms were encouraged to transfer
American technology and capital abroad. Because of Tokyo's
restrictive import and foreign investment policies, American
companies found that the sale of technology licenses was one
of the few means of profiting in the Japanese market.
These early technology "give-aways" would come back to haunt
American manufacturers in later years. 53
By the late 1950s/early 1960s, Japan's rapid economic
recovery led to a shift in American rhetoric, away from
references to Tokyo's dependence on the U.S. toward Japan's
role as fellow "world power" and U.S. "partner." 54 The
underlying reality placed significant limits on such
characterizations, however. While the 1960 U.S. -Japan
Security Treaty did much to restore Japanese sovereignty,
Tokyo remained dependent on the U.S. for its external
defense. A condition which had been acknowledged in Japan's
1957 Basic Policy for National Defense. In 1962 President
Kennedy reiterated Japan's economic dependence on the U.S.
as a market for and sponsor of its exports when he publicly
highlighted the "need [for] the bargaining tools of the new
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[American] Trade Expansion Act to bring Japan fully into the
free-world trading system." 55
These themes of implied dependence continued as late as
1965 when an Assistant Secretary of State noted that
"Japan's economic growth and rising living standards since
the war have rested heavily on its trade with the U.S."
Furthermore, he noted:
Militarily, we share a vital stake in Japan's safety from
subversion and attack. Transfer of Japan's great human
and industrial resources to the communist side would so
drastically affect the balance of world power as to be of
hardly less concern to us than to Japan itself. Japan's
defense forces are assuming increasing responsibility for
Japan's home defense, but political-military realities in
the Far East continue to make far-reaching mutual security
arrangements essential to both Japan and the U.S. 56
While Tokyo, owing to its growing economic strength, was
expected to share in the task of regional economic assis-
tance during the 1960s, the U.S. did not "yet see a sharing
by... [Japan] of the task of assisting in [regional]
security" even as late as 1968. 57 Furthermore, it was
asserted at the time, "relief from this burden has contri-
buted in a fundamental way to Japan's capability for
economic and social growth." 58
Thus, by the mid- to late 1960s Japan's "economic
miracle" was in full swing accelerated by, if not largely
the result of, the indirect subsidies derived from American
postwar economic and security patronage. This asymmetric
relationship, justified in American eyes by Cold War
security imperatives, was also acceptable to Japanese
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leaders who, according to historian Kenneth Pyle, "wel-
come[d] the dependence on the United States." 59 Indeed,
Tokyo's acceptance of dependency "assured Japanese security
without the burden of massive defense expenditures, . .
.
facilitated the accelerated rebuilding of Japanese industry,
and... got Japan virtually unimpeded access to the largest
market and the best technology in the world." 60 It also
neatly fit the Japanese culture's hierarchic view of
relationships— even those at the state- to-state level.
However, by the late 1960s, America's growing frustration in
Vietnam as well as the shift in the U.S. -Japan trade rela-
tionship from consistent surplus to persistent deficit led
many Americans to reconsider the costs and benefits of Japa-
nese dependency. Indeed, Japan's growing economic wealth
seemed to obviate the need for such dependency at all.
C. JAPAN: "THE ALLY/PARTNER" OR "THE FREE RIDER/ECONOMIC
ADVERSARY" (1969-1989)
By the mid- to late 1960s, American views of Japan began
sharply to diverge. While Japan was still viewed as a mili-
tary ally, it was also increasingly seen to be a "free
rider" which benefitted substantially from the U.S. security
umbrella but failed to share the cost of those defense
burdens at a level commensurate with its economic capa-
bility. In the economic arena, Japan was seen to be a key
U.S. partner based on its status as America's largest
overseas trade partner as well as its increasingly important
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contributions to U.S. regional development goals. However,
because Japan "cont inue [ d ] to enjoy virtually unrestricted
trade and investment opportunities in the United States
while American trade and investment in Japan ...[ were ] still
subject to so many limitations," there was a growing frus-
tration in the U.S. "that elements of economic recipro-
city ...[ were ] lacking in the relationship." 61
1. "Ally" versus "Free Rider"
Emergence of the military "free ride" assertion was
based on the perception that:
Since 1945 only a very modest part of Japan's national
resources has been devoted to military use. In 1965 only
1.3 percent of Japan's GNP went into military use. Relief
from this burden has contributed in a fundamental way to
Japan's capability for economic and social growth. 62
This outcome was not wholely unintended--as has been dis-
cussed, American policy-makers had given priority to Japan's
economic recovery for nearly two decades and had been
willing, in the meantime, to subsidize Japan's defense.
Although asymmetric, this was not a wholely one-sided
arrangement. While the U.S. committed itself to Japan's
defense without any reciprocal commitment from Tokyo, the
Japanese conceded a significant level of sovereignty in
allowing U.S. forces virtually unrestricted access to a
strategically located set of military bases and accepted the
risk of involvement in any global conflict between the U.S.
and the Soviet Union.
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Nonetheless, as then Ambassador John Foster Dulles
warned in 1951: "The U.S. is not willing to station forces
in Japan for very long unless the Japanese do... all they can
for their own defense;" otherwise, "...their tendency is all
too likely to be to... seek the continued presence of U.S.
forces, and to concentrate on raising their standard of
living." 63 Sixteen years later presidential aspirant
Richard Nixon appeared to be reiterating this same concern
when he wrote of Japan: "Looking toward the future, one
must recognize that it simply is not realistic to expect a
nation moving into the first rank of major powers to be
totally dependent for its own security on another nation,
however close the ties." 64
The Nixon Doctrine of 1969, heavily influenced by
the escalating costs and frustrations of America's Vietnam
involvement, was an attempt to transfer defense respon-
sibilities and costs to more capable U.S. allies in Asia,
including Japan. Thus, according to the Nixon Doctrine,
while the U.S. would maintain its treaty obligations as well
as a nuclear umbrella, "in cases involving other types of
aggression, we shall furnish military and economic assis-
tance... but we shall look to the nation directly threatened
to assume the primary responsibility of providing the
manpower for its defense." 65
As a result of this policy shift, the contention
that Japan was "totally dependent for its own security on
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another nation [the U.S.]" 66 was supplanted in a short two
and one half years by the American position, though not the
reality, that "Japan's already substantial armed forces are
now responsible for their country's immediate conventional
defense." 67 This revised view of Japan's security respon-
sibilities and capabilities was probably meant not only for
consistency with the larger policy but also to encourage
greater Japanese defense efforts as well as to assuage "free
rider" critics. It was still acknowledged, however, that
beyond "responsibility for its own conventional defense,...
it is doubtful whether there is much more that ... [Tokyo
]
could do that would directly relieve United States military
responsibilities in Japan, almost all of which are related
to regional commitments." 68 Indeed, "Japanese-American
friendship and cooperation. .. [would remain] the linchpin for
peace in the Pacific." 69
While superpower detente and post-Vietnam U.S.
retrenchment diverted American attention away from U.S.-
Japan security issues, the Japanese grew concerned over the
apparent "decline of America's economic and military power
and questioned the ability of the United States to main-
tain its commitments in the Western Pacific." 70 Japanese
concerns were exacerbated by the so-called "Nixon shocks"
and especially by U.S. rapprochement with the PRC, a major
policy shift made without consultations with Tokyo.
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These developments encouraged a relatively small
number of nationalistic Japanese leaders to advocate a more
politically independent and militarily "autonomous" Japan.
However, declining superpower tensions during the early to
mid-1970s and persisting domestic and regional constraints
on Japanese rearmament led Tokyo to adopt a fairly modest
National Defense Program Outline ( NDPO ) in 1976. The NDPO
set out a force structure framework based on a "minimum
necessary level of defense forces" but set no specific pro-
curement timetable 71 ; instead, acquisition would be kept
within the adopted limit on defense expenditures of one
percent of GNP. In 1980 the Japanese formulated the concept
of "comprehensive national security" which envisioned the
application of a combination of political, economic and
self-defense measures, rather than military capabilities
alone, to safeguard Japan's security interests.
By the late 1970s, however, growing Soviet adven-
turism became a matter of concern to both Japanese and
American leaders. The Carter Administration, concerned by
both Soviet actions as well as a deteriorating U.S. economy,
renewed pressure on Tokyo to assume greater defense burdens
by accelerating rearmament. This pressure was intensified
by an even more vocal American Congress. In its 1981
Defense White Paper Japan responded by specifically identi-
fying the USSR as its major security threat. 72 However, its
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tangible defense contributions continued to fall short of
most American expectations.
Thus, the revival of conflict between U.S. views of
Japan as ally versus "free rider" came to be framed within
the debate over the appropriate level of defense "burden
sharing" by Tokyo. During the Carter years this debate
centered on Japan's assumption of greater costs of defense;
later, during the Reagan years, it would shift to an empha-
sis on responsibilities , often referred to as military
"roles and missions." Japan did, in fact, respond to
pressure to increase its cost share by such actions as its
1978 initiative to begin "host-nation support" payments to
the U.S. government as an off-set to the costs of main-
taining American forces in Japan. Tokyo also agreed to
efforts to coordinate planning, increase interoperability
and expand bilateral exercises under the 1978 U.S. -Japan
Guidelines for Defense Cooperation. Explicit Japanese
recognition of the Soviet threat was welcomed by Washington
as well. However, Tokyo's security contributions still
failed to meet what many Americans, in and out of govern-
ment, considered appropriate given Japan's growing trade
surpluses and the size of its GNP (already by the late
1970s the second highest in the free world). As a result,
divergent U.S. views of Japan persisted.
For example, a year and a half after President
Carter commented that "the security relationship between the
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two countries has never been so strong and mutually advan-
tageous as at present," 73 his Defense Secretary, Harold
Brown, would strongly criticize Tokyo by remarking in
December 1980 that Japan's 1981 defense budget "falls
seriously short, whether measured by the security
si tuat ion , . . . or by considerations of equitable burden-
sharing." 74 This latter statement was supported by an
earlier 1980 Congressional study which called for Japan to
"assume a greater role in its own defense and that this
should entail real increases in defense spending." 75
The Reagan Administration initially echoed the
policy of praise for the overall security relationship but
criticism of Japan's inadequate defense cost sharing. In
April 1981, for example, one top administration official
referred to "our relationship with Japan... [as] the corner-
stone of our policy in Asia... [as well as] one of the most
close and vital relationships in our global alliance struc-
ture," 76 while another lamented that "Japan's capability for
self-defense at this point remains short of what is clearly
required." 77 Later that year the American approach began to
shift after then Prime Minister Suzuki specifically
committed the JSDF to "defend its own territory, the sea and
skies around Japan, and its sealanes to a distance of 1000
miles." 78 As result, although "the burden of the meaningful
defense of Japan still rest[ed] largely with the United
States," the U.S. was encouraged that "meaningful United
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States- Japanese defense burden-sharing goals ...[ had ] been
set and publicly acknowledged at the highest levels for the
first time in the post-1945 era." 79
Tokyo's commitment to sealane defense and the vocal
support it received from Suzuki's successor, Yasuhiro
Nakasone , led to a new U.S. emphasis on responsibility vice
cost sharing by Japan. In the defense arena this led to a
concentration on expanded "roles and missions" for the JSDF,
within the framework of the U.S. -Japan alliance, rather than
increased defense expenditures per se (though certainly the
latter was expected to result). The responsibility sharing
concept also emphasized a regional and even global part-
nership in the pursuit of diplomatic and development goals.
One writer has characterized this as a fundamental strategic
shift from an emphasis on a U.S. -China axis in East Asia
during the 1970s to a U.S. -Japan axis in the 1980s. 80
Whether or not this was the case, the policy of focusing on
U.S. -Japan responsibility sharing and partnership persisted
through the 1980s and achieved some notable successes (e.g.,
Japan's brief breach of the one percent GNP limit on defense
expenditures, its accession to the position of the world's
largest dispenser of foreign aid, its growing host-nation
support payments to Washington and its agreements to share
military technology with the U.S.). However, the tendencies
of the Reagan and Bush Administrations publicly to downplay
divisive burden sharing issues and highlight these
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accomplishments have not squelched criticism from other
quarters, especially a vocal group of American Congressmen.
During the 1980s, the Congress made several efforts
to pressure Japan to increase its defense expenditures as
well as its host-nation support for U.S. forces in Japan.
Record U.S. budget shortfalls and trade deficits with Japan
as well as continued frustration with Tokyo's trade and
business policies account for much of this activity. In
addition to earlier attempts to induce Japan to increase
defense expenditures, the 1990 Defense Appropriations Bill
urged the President to negotiate 100 percent Japanese
host-nation support for U.S. forces stationed there. The
1991 bill initially included language threatening a phased
American withdrawal from Japan if Tokyo failed to assume the
full costs of support for U.S. forces in Japan. 81 Thus, even
as international security conditions began rapidly to change
in the late 1980s, the U.S. debate over Japan's appropriate
alliance contribution continues to revolve around the free
ride perception.
The persistence of conflicting views of Japan the
"strategic ally" versus Japan "the free rider," which have
intensified over the past twenty years, are not conducive to
a stable and mutually beneficial long-term security rela-
tionship. However, the relevance of the debate itself may
be diminishing as a result of the profound changes in the
international security environment since November 1989 when
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the Berlin Wall came tumbling down. This is not to imply
that there are not troubling issues in the U.S-Japan
relationship still to be resolved, only that they must be
examined in a new context of post-Cold War American and
Japanese security interests.
2. "Partner" versus "Economic Adversary"
The economic partnership between Japan and the
United States which contributed to Japan's postwar recovery
and to regional development in South Korea, Taiwan and
Southeast Asia, began seriously to unravel in the late
1960s. American concern over the threat to U.S. jobs from
cheap Japanese exports as well as frustration over Tokyo's
protectionist policies, though evident since the 1950s,
hardened as a result of persistent U.S. trade deficits with
Japan that began in 1965. While continuing to emphasize the
importance of Japanese economic strength and the U.S. -Japan
commercial partnership, already by the mid-1960s America's
largest transoceanic trade relationship, U.S. officials and
businessmen began to call for an end to the era of "special
privileges" and unreciprocated trade benefits enjoyed by
Japan. 8 2
Japanese-U. S . economic relations suffered major
strains as a result of the textile dispute of 1968-69 and
the Nixon "economic shocks" of 1971 including the unilateral
decisions to suspend convertibility of the dollar to gold,
to adopt floating exchange rates and to impose a ten percent
36
surcharge on imports. Declining U.S. economic performance
and accumulating government debt during the 1970s coupled
with a growing American trade deficit with Japan and
increasingly visible Japanese penetration of key U.S. market
sectors--such as steel, consumer electronics, and compact
automobiles— heightened American awareness of and concern
for Japanese economic competition.
Despite the deteriorating economic imbalances and
growing Congressional and business community frustration
with Japanese trade policies, successive American adminis-
trations have adhered to free trade principles supported by
the position that such a large and complex economic rela-
tionship cannot be "entirely free of difficulties," 83 that
this will "inevitably produce some friction," 84 and that
"successful management of the tensions ... is essential" 85 to
preserving the larger political and security partnership.
Throughout most of the 1970s and 1980s the primary American
approach to resolve U.S. -Japan trade disputes was to pursue
case-by-case bilateral negotiations to open specific Japa-
nese market sectors or to protect American manufacturers
threatened by Japanese competition. However, a growing
bilateral trade deficit through the mid-1980s, peaking at
$52 billion in 1987, 86 appeared to discredit these efforts.
Largely as a result, since the late 1980s a number
of vocal critics, the so-called revisionists or "Japan-
bashers," have argued that the inadequacies of U.S.
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economic and trade policies toward Japan reflect a
fundamental misunderstanding of Japanese national goals,
their economic system and the cultural values which underlie
both. 87 They further assert that Japan is a
"neomercant il ist " state which does not embrace the same free
trade goals as the U.S. or share America's vision of world
order. 88 Failure to recognize this, or to negotiate and
compete with the Japanese on the basis of these realities,
renders U.S. trade policy toward Japan inef fect ive--an
argument that will be examined in more detail later.
Furthermore, these and other critics argue that Japan, which
became the world's largest creditor nation in 1986 even as
the U.S. became the world's largest debtor, is promoting
American financial dependency through massive Japanese
foreign direct and portfolio investments in the U.S. 89
Despite recent net outflows of Japanese investment
in U.S. government securities as well as the declining
American trade deficit with Japan over the past three years
(owing to such factors as Japanese market opening and
off-shore production, a more realistic yen-dollar exchange
rate, greater export emphasis by American manufacturers and
the U.S. recession), critics contend that these represent
only the temporary reversal of a trend. Permanent resolu-
tion of the structural imbalances in the U.S. -Japan economic
relationship cannot occur, they believe, without fundamental
changes in U.S. and Japanese domestic economic policies and
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in American trade policies toward Japan (the latter buying
the time to accomplish the former). A vocal faction of
protectionist U.S. Congressmen as well as a growing segment
of the American public, according to recent polls, seem to
agree. Indeed, even the American government now appears to
recognize that Japan is different and must be dealt with
accordingly. This is reflected in the shift in trade
negotiating strategy from a case-by-case approach to the
more comprehensive Structural Impediments Initiative (SII).
The SII emphasizes broad Japanese structural barriers to
imports (economic, political and even cultural) rather than
specific tariffs or non-tariff barriers, as well as U.S.
domestic impediments to trade competitiveness. 90
The mounting tensions in the U.S. -Japan relationship
created by conflicting images of "global partner" and
"economic adversary" can only be exacerbated by the growing
perception of a "new world order," brought on by the
watershed events of late 1989 and early 1990, in which the
factor of national economic power appears more weighty than
military capability. The persistence of serious U.S.-
Japanese economic-strategic imbalances could make the
construction of a genuine partnership difficult, if not
impossible, for the foreseeable future.
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D. IMPLICATIONS OF POSTWAR AMERICAN PERCEPTIONS OF JAPAN
Postwar American views of Japan have been shaped by the
unique circumstances created by Cold War security condi-
tions. In a zero-sum, bipolar world, U.S. interests
supported the creation of an economically strong Japan
closely tied to the West and dependent on American security
guarantees. Indeed, this paramount goal was allowed to
supercede American economic interests during a period when
U.S. industry clearly dominated the non-communist inter-
national economy. However, America's declining economic
performance beginning in the late 1960s as well as its
frustrating experience in Vietnam led to a reassessment of
the structure and scope of U.S. alliance commitments.
Japan's continued reliance on non-reciprocated trade
benefits as well as the deferral of security responsi-
bilities and costs to the United States, despite its strong
economic resurgence during and after the 1960s, drew
particular criticism from some Americans. Although the
character of this criticism has evolved over the past three
decades, it continues to color the relationship and remains
a strong counterpoint to the view of Japan as a critical
strategic ally of the U.S. The coexistence of these
ambiguous views of Japan's role in American strategy--"ally'
but "free rider", "partner" but "economic adversary"--have
placed significant strain on the relationship. Changing
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international security conditions, beginning in 1989 with
the fall of the Berlin Wall, promise to further intensify
the contradictions between these conflicting views of Japan
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III. CURRENT CONTEXT OF JAPAN'S ROLE IN U.S. STRATEGY
A. THE NEW INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT
1. The End of the Cold War
Because the evolution of the postwar U.S. -Japan
relationship owes much to Cold War security considerations,
recent international events have significant implications
for the future of the alliance. As described earlier, the
primary rationale for emphasizing the strategic importance
of American- Japan relations while largely downplaying
divisive economic issues has been the imperatives of the
American strategy for containing Soviet expansionist aims.
During the late 1960s, the purpose of this approach shifted
from an effort to shore-up the Japanese "counterweight to
Communist strength in Asia" 91 toward a "division of labor"
in which Japan would share political, economic and military
burdens with the United States. This new emphasis, which
still guides U.S. policy, was from the beginning fraught
with underlying tension since it tacitly validates the very
free ride argument which the critics of U.S. -Japan relations
have long put forward. These tensions have intensified as
Japan's economic imbalances with the U.S. have grown and
efforts to redress them, either through trade negotiations
or burden sharing initiatives, have lagged.
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Despite the intensifying contradiction between
American views of Japan, successive American administrations
have relied on the unifying impetus of the security rela-
tionship to overcome the divisive forces of economic rivalry
and frustration. Although government-to-government crises
have periodically flared (e.g., over textiles, semi-
conductors, FSX development and Super-301 citation), this
approach has largely succeeded in holding official relations
together. However, radically changing international
security conditions suggest that the key underlying
rationale for the U.S. -Japan security relat ionship--the
threat of Soviet or Soviet sponsored expansion--has signi-
ficantly diminished. Although recent events in the USSR
raise some doubts as to the permanence of Moscow's policy
changes, there is reason to believe that Soviet power can be
checked in the future without a return to the predominant
Cold War containment strategy.
The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the shift to a
defensive Soviet military doctrine, domestic ethnic and
political divisions, and a deteriorating economic situation,
which may prove unsalvageable without Western assistance,
militate against the renewal of Soviet expansionist policies
in the immediate future even under a more hard-line leader-
ship. This is not to suggest that international political
competition between the U.S. and the USSR will cease alto-
gether in a post-Cold War world nor does it preclude the
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possibility of a resurgent Soviet Union with national
interests in direct conflict with those of the United
States. However, the bipolar zero-sum ideological struggle
which has dominated the global security environment and the
American world-view for the past forty-five years seems
likely over time to be replaced by a more historically
typical international system. This essentially non-polar
environment would be characterized by nation-state competi-
tion for such traditional measures of national power as
market and resource access, financial wealth, political
influence, technological superiority as well as military
capability. The endurance of Cold War-era collective or
bipolar security alignments cannot be taken for granted in
such an international system unless they can prove their
continued validity based on a new set of mutual interests.
While changing conditions in the USSR have had more
profound influence in the political and military landscape
of Europe than the Asia-Pacific region, significant changes
are no less evident. Sino-Soviet rapprochement, South
Korean-Soviet normalization, declining Soviet military
presence in Vietnam and diminishing aid to both Hanoi and
Pyongyang, Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia, some
preliminary signs of North Korean opening to Japan and South
Korea, North and South Korean application for separate U.N.
memberships, and Soviet force reductions in the Far Eastern
theater which "appear to be proceeding generally in
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accordance with Gorbachev's stated commitment" 92 are among
the trends suggesting that the Cold War is drawing to a
close in East Asia as well.
Despite these positive trends, some Cold War era
conflicts remain unresolved-- tensions in the Korean penin-
sula, civil war in Cambodia and the Japanese Northern Terri-
tories dispute, for instance. However, with the exception
of the latter, the Soviet role in these conflicts has dimi-
nished (and even in the latter case its role is being
challenged by one of its own republics). The Soviet mili-
tary has reduced its presence outside of its territory and
adjacent seas, Soviet aid to former allies such as Vietnam
and North Korea has been significantly curtailed and the
appeal of the Soviet model, past or present, has virtually
disappeared. East and Southeast Asia are no longer ripe
targets for Soviet expansion nor does Moscow appear to
possess the wherewithal to pursue such policies. Where they
are building political bridges, as with South Korea, Soviet
motives appear to be economic, not ideological. Based on
these and other developments, the Chairman of the U.S. Joint
Chiefs of Staff has concluded: "In the Pacific, it is
unlikely that the Soviets would initiate hostilities that
threaten our interests." 93
The net effect of these changes on U.S. -Japan
relations is to undercut the key element of the strategic
equation which has provided the "glue" for the relationship.
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Without the Soviet threat the military-strategic imperative
for the security alliance is seriously diminished. While
other threats to Japan are possible--a newly belligerent
China or nuclear capable North Korea, for instance--they are
either unlikely or could probably be managed diplomatically.
Indeed, the end of the Cold War, which began with the
collapse of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, represents a
watershed in the context of U.S. -Japan relations probably as
fundamental as that which was ushered in by the beginning of
the Cold War in the late 1940s.
Thus far, in response to the "real and/or perceived
reduction of the Soviet threat," as well as domestic fiscal
constraints, the United States has refocused its Asia-
Pacific military role to one of "regional balancer, honest
broker, and ultimate security guarantor" 94 and has initiated
a force drawdown in the region. While this new strategic
focus continues to view Japan as the "critical linchpin,"
the rationale for such a characterization seems overstated
in the absence of a significant Soviet threat. Without this
strong and clear-cut strategic underpinning, the credibility
of much of the rhetoric which has been used to overshadow
divisive economic issues in the U.S. -Japan relationship may
be undercut. This is particularly true in a new global
environment in which economic competitiveness and power may
be as relevant as military capability.
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2. The Persian Gulf Diversion
Some observers of recent events, particularly the
Persian Gulf crisis and war, assert that the end of the Cold
War has had less impact on the global security environment
than was assumed prior to the second of August 1990.
Spec i f ically
:
The slow build-up towards the Gulf War and the swift,
one-sided execution by the U.S. -led coalition have put to
test some notions about the post-Cold War world that were
becoming fashionable, if not universally accepted, in
Washington policy circles before Iraq invaded Kuwait in
August
.
The first such idea to be challenged by the Gulf War
is that the end of the Cold War would make economic power
paramount and, thus, transform Japan and Germany into new
superpowers and rivals of the U.S. One implication of
this was that Japan was a more serious threat than the
Soviet Union to the security of the U.S., now only first
among equals. After the Gulf War, the dividing line
between those who can act militarily and those who cannot
suddenly appears important once again. 95
Others argue that the Persian Gulf episode has
demonstrated that the "new world order" emerging in the wake
of the Cold War is not a multipolar but a unipolar inter-
national system dominated by the United States. Indeed:
Already there are mutterings about a unipolar world, a new
American century, and how Japan and Germany can be bossed
around. Such unilateralists do not buy talk of coali-
tions: 85% of the troops in the Gulf, they point out,
were American; the decision to go to war was Mr. Bush's;
left to itself the U.N. would have tried to resolve the
consequences of Iraq's aggression by sanctions alone; the
Europeans are incapable of speaking with a common voice,
the Japanese of making up their minds. However many
allies join in, it is America that will have to do the
confronting and disarming of outlaw states. Better that
it believes in its own Tightness and gets on with it. 96
47
These arguments suggest that the end of the Cold War
has not significantly altered the predominant role of mili-
tary power and alliances in the global security environment.
In this view, Cold War era military security relationships
such as the U.S. -Japan alliance remain as relevant as
before; and the assertion that economic competitiveness
should share equal consideration with military threats in
American national security planning is largely discounted.
While there is legitimacy to the belief that "the
value of military clout did not vanish with the ending of
the Cold War," 97 events in the Persian Gulf should not be
viewed as more than a temporary diversion from post-Cold War
trends. Indeed, whatever lessons the U.S. government has
learned from the Gulf War, none have led to a reversal in
course from its initial post-Cold War policy directions.
For example, despite the Gulf experience the Bush
administration has submitted a "proposed 1992 defense budget
[which] marks the first step in a massive restructuring of
the military that will scrap the current command structure
and shrink the force by one-fourth over five years."
According to senior defense officials, this restructuring
will produce "a military scaled to meet the U.S. defense
needs in a relatively tranquil post-Cold War world." 98 The
Gulf War has produced no reversal of course in America's
planned five year military drawdown which continues to be
48
driven by the decline of Cold War tensions, the shift toward
a "new world order" and fiscal realities.
While the shape of the new world order remains ill-
defined in practical terms, the new importance of economic
power was demonstrated, not discounted, by the Gulf crisis.
Speci f ically
:
The proof that economic power will indeed become crucial,
if not paramount, is seen in the fact that more than 75%
of the coalition's war costs are being paid by non-U. S.
governments. The U.S. may have emerged from the Gulf War
as the only military superpower as well as the only
country capable of forging and leading a coalition of
diverse nations, but it was clear it could not execute the
war without financial help from Japan, Germany and the
oil-producing allies."
And, while one could argue that the Gulf War demonstrated
the importance of collective action, it should be noted that
the coalition participants were either not bound by formal
alliances at all or were acting outside the bounds of
existing alliance obligations. Common interests, not treaty
commitments created the Gulf coalition and preserved it . As
a result, "realism suggests that Washington should approach
future coalitions on a case-by-case basis, rather than
relying on the gulf alliance as a model." 100
The Persian Gulf crisis does not invalidate the view
that the end of the Cold War is producing a fundamental
shift in the national security paradigm. The centrality of
the Soviet military threat and communist expansion has given
way to broader concerns including regional instability,
economic competitiveness, nuclear proliferation, and
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environmental and health threats. The implications of this
shift are no less important for Japan than they are for the
United States. However, due to domestic and regional
constraints on their international behavior, the Japanese
appear far less capable of decisive military-strategic
action in the face of these changes than hoped for by the
U.S. government.
3. Prospects for Change in Japan
Japan's postwar security policy and attendant mili-
tary rearmament have always been subject to certain stan-
dards of domestic and regional acceptability. This reflects
the need to overcome real but largely self-imposed con-
straints on Japanese security policy. As Donald Hellman has
recently written, these constraints on a more independent or
assertive Japanese security posture are based on three
"myths:"
1. "Japan's constitutional limits on any change in the
current restricted security role;"
2. "the profound domestic political opposition to
expanded Japanese military activities;" and
3. "the deep fear felt in all East Asian nations (and
the Soviet Union) at the prospect of a 'rearmed
Japan' . "i 01
Each of these "myths" deserves closer scrutiny.
The "myth" of a legal/constitutional constraint on
Japanese security strategy is rooted in Article Nine of
Japan's postwar constitution. Article Nine renounces
"...war as the sovereign right of the nation" and goes on to
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pledge that "...land, sea and air forces, as well as other
war potential, will never be maintained" and "the right of
belligerency of the state will not be recognized." 102
Because there is little international legal precedent for
defining such terminology as "war potential" and "right of
belligerency," the Japanese are left with wide latitude for
interpreting the legal and policy implications of Article
Nine. Japanese courts have largely sidestepped the issue,
in one case declaring in effect that the "constitutionality
of the SDF should be determined by the will of the people
and built through consensus rather than a definitive legal
stroke." 103 One analyst of the article describes it "...as
an expression of Japan's anguish from the suffering endured
during its previous war" which "...poses no specific legal
obstacle to Japanese defense forces." 104
Thus, the policy choices which have resulted in the
existence of the SDF, it purpose and mission, its size and
force structure as well as the bilateral security relation-
ship with the U.S. almost solely reflect political rather
than legal considerations. 105 As a result, the only real
legal/constitutional constraints on Japanese security
strategy are those imposed by political decisions.
Although there are strong arguments for revising the
constitution to make "laws correspond to reality," 106
Japanese leaders have generally preferred to perpetuate the
ambiguity associated with an "extraconstitutional" SDF.
51
This has contributed to the gradualist approach to Japan's
postwar rearmament which has largely ensured that public and
international consensus have kept pace with the evolution of
Japanese security strategy. For instance, Japan has been
able to use the legal/constitutional constraint argument as
one means of deflecting U.S. pressures for security policy
changes which would exceed the perceived bounds of domestic
and regional acceptance. It seems particularly ironic for
Japan to aim this argument at the Americans who imposed the
postwar "peace" constitution on Japan. In reality then,
there appear to be few, if any, absolute legal/constitu-
tional constraints on Japan's security strategy, but only
the relative limits of how far the Japanese government can
go unilaterally without fomenting domestic political crisis
or provoking unfavorable regional backlash.
The second "myth," that of domestic political con-
straints on expanded Japanese military activities, has its
roots in Japan's catastrophic World War Two defeat and the
Japanese public's consequent aversion to war. It is com-
pounded by a Japanese "fear of themselves"--a concern that
democratic institutions and political culture are not deeply
rooted in Japanese society and could under certain condi-
tions give way to militarism once again. 107 Despite the
resulting pacifist-tending mood among the majority of the
Japanese people, 108 the notion that this national consensus
imposes absolute limits on Japan's security strategy is
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challenged by the tolerance of a gradual but persistent
evolution of that strategy over the past forty years.
During the 1950s, jet aircraft, submarines and air-
craft carriers were considered to be unacceptable offensive
weapons and Japanese self-defense began at the shoreline.
Today Japan has jet fighters and diesel submarines in its
inventory, has a VSTOL aircraft carrier on the drawing
boards and has extended its defense commitment out into
surrounding airspace and out to 1000 miles on the high
seas. 109 A majority of the Japanese public has for some
time recognized the necessity of the SDF and favors the
U.S. -Japan security treaty. 110 In addition, the main
political opposition--the Japan Socialist Party--has
accepted the SDF as "unconstitutional but legal" and has





Thus, although sudden dramatic shifts toward an
expanded Japanese security strategy would almost certainly
meet with serious and possibly disastrous domestic political
opposition (the aborted pre-war plan to dispatch unarmed SDF
troops to the Persian Gulf being a relatively mild example),
gradual policy changes have clearly succeeded in the past.
In the future such shifts might not require as much pain-




It is a mistake ... to derive long-term conclusions about
the international role of Japan from a supposed deep and
permanent committment of the public to a place on the
sidelines of power politics. . . . Since the Japanese public
resembles other publics in an altered international






Changing international and domestic conditions, the
passing of the World War Two generation and more decisive or
charismatic political leadership are examples of the types
of factors which might remove some measure of the domestic
political constraints on more timely expansion of Japanese
military activities. In any case, future significant shifts
in Japan's security strategy are not impossible and would
likely be constrained only in pace of adoption and imple-
mentation rather than in substance (the recently announced
postwar plan to dispatch SDF mine sweepers to the Persian
Gulf is an example of such an unexpected policy shift 113 ).
The third of Hellman's "myths" is the constraint
imposed by regional fears of a revival of Japanese mili-
tarism, compounded in intensity by Japan's growing economic
dominance of the area. It is argued that the strength of
these fears militates against a wider military role for
Japan in East and Southeast Asia. Suspicion of potential
Japanese military intentions have deep historical roots in
the legacy of Japan's exploitive, often brutal expansion and
colonialism prior to and during World War Two.
Although new generations of Asians have no personal
memories of this experience, Japan's constant reassurances
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of its intention never to become a military power have not
put the issue to rest for several reasons. First, "long-
standing Japanese [economic] preeminence throughout the
region in direct investment, trade, finance, and technology
has yielded remarkably little goodwill" due to its often
self-serving character and its isolation from any convincing
political agenda. 114 Second, in the eyes of many other
Asians, Japan has failed to accept full and unambiguous
responsibility for its "wartime and colonial activities." 115
In fact, the "school textbook" controversy of the early
1980s and periodic statements by Japanese political leaders
and bureaucrats have implied just the opposite. Finally,
there is an element of expediency in this issue in that it
gives Japan's neighbors a measure of leverage over the
Japanese and gives the Japanese themselves another con-
venient policy constraint to hide behind when it serves
their purposes to do so.
But like the domestic "myths," regional opposition
to Japanese military expansion, either qualitative, numeri-
cal or operational, does not place absolute limits on
Japanese security policy. As long as Japanese rearmament
has been effectively rationalized, it has largely been
accepted, if not always encouraged, by other regional actors
(particularly those generally aligned with the U.S. against
the Soviets). In fact, regional opposition to expanded
Japanese military roles appears to be shifting toward a more
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ambivalent attitude. Thus, while some Chinese and ASEAN
leaders are viewing Japan more warily in the emerging
post-Cold War world, others recognize the inevitability and
necessity of a larger Japanese role. 116 As an Indonesian
diplomat said of Japan's recent reluctance to participate in
the multinational force in Saudi Arabia because, among other
reasons, "it would arouse anxiety among [its] neighbors:"
Sure, we remember the militarism and imperialism. .. in the
30s and 40s. But, this is the 90s, and the threat is
Saddam and his ilk. The Japanese are using our hang-ups
as a cover for their own. 117
Clearly, regional "hang-ups" are situational, not
unconditional
.
These "myths" constraining Japanese security
strategy do not themselves pose absolute limits on Japan's
policy options. Instead, the Japanese government has
generally elected to accept rather than challenge them.
This has served a number of purposes. It has placed limits
on the resources committed to military forces as well as the
risks inherent in a more assertive defense policy. It has
allowed Japan to concentrate on economic objectives while
"the United States... has insulated Japan from the political,
psychological, and economic cost and responsibilities asso-
ciated with an orthodox national role in global defense
arrangements." 118 Finally, it has afforded the Japanese a
significant measure of flexibility, allowing them to gra-
dually press and expand the limits imposed by the
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constraints when it is in their interest to do so and to
hide behind those limits to avoid action when that serves
their interests.
As long as Japan chooses to accept these constraints
rather than challenge them it will be required to establish
and maintain a set of legitimizing assumptions to
rationalize and gain acceptability for its defense policies.
Over the past decade the assumptions have centered on
Tokyo's focus on the Soviet threat, its close alignment with
the U.S., and its continued emphasis on the narrowly
defensive mission of its military forces. These assumptions
have allowed Japan, under pressure from the U.S. or its own
defense hawks, to press the limits of its policy constraints
when necessary without appearing to directly challenge them.
This exercise in ambiguity has largely succeeded and is
likely to persist. However, the strategic foundation of the
current set of legitimizing assumptions is being undermined
by the emerging changes in the security environment in East
Asia. In particular, Tokyo will find it difficult to
rationalize continued rearmament and wider defense missions
in the face of a diminishing Soviet threat (which the
Japanese government is only reluctantly, and in some cases
barely, acknowledging 119 ) as well as the drawdown in the
U.S. military presence.
Without a new set of acceptable assumptions, Tokyo
is likely to find it difficult, both domestically and
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regionally, to press the constraints on its security
policies. Indeed, in this period of international
uncertainty Japan seems even more likely to fall back on the
low risk foreign policy approach it has successfully pursued
for the past 40 years. Thus, expectations of a larger
security role for Japan as a means of reducing the American
burden, while not impossible, may be no more realistic in
the near-term than are the chances that Tokyo will move
decisively to eliminate its non-tariff trade barriers and
restructure its economy to encourage foreign competition and
investment. It is not inconceivable that Japan will change,
indeed it is likely; however, largely as a result of the
policy constraints described above, the Japanese will change
at their own pace not at America's. It is also possible
that Japan will see its post-Cold War interests better
served by a reiteration of its comprehensive security
approach rather than continued reliance on close alignment
with the United States. In any case, it seems unlikely that
Japanese initiated changes will be either decisive enough or
in the direction required to reconcile conflicting U.S.
views of Japan. Only modifications to American policy
promise to accomplish this.
B. CONFLICTING AMERICAN VIEWS OF JAPAN
Over the past two decades there have developed intensi-
fying contradictions between American views of Japan's role
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in U.S. national security strategy. One view holds the
U.S. -Japan relationship to be a key element of U.S.
strategy. This is the official U.S. government view and is
represented in the following excerpt from the March 1990
National Security Strategy of the United States:
Our alliance with Japan remains a centerpiece of our
security policy and an important anchor of stability.
Japan's importance is now global. Our relationship is one
of the most important bilateral relationships in the world
and it is in our strategic interest to preserve it. 120
Contrary to this official view, elements of the U.S.
government and particularly the Congress, as well as a
sizeable portion of the American public, consider Japan to
be an appropriate ob.ject rather than element of U.S.
strategy. Indeed:
The American public's concern over the economic might
of Japan appears to have risen sharply, heightening senti-
ment for limits on foreign investments, as Americans worry
more about Japanese economic power than about Soviet
military power. 121
This contrary view is lately following two distinct
lines of reasoning. The primary perception, highlighted by
a number of public opinion polls over the past two years,
emphasizes the Japanese economic threat to the U.S. The
other, more subtly expressed view, emphasizes the potential
threat to East Asian stability of resurgent, more indepen-
dent Japanese military power.
1. Japan as an Element of U.S. Strategy
In the late 1940s/early 1950s, the U.S. -Japan
security alliance became the "anchor" of U.S. containment
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policy in the Asia-Pacific region. It has continued to be
viewed as a key element of American national security
strategy. In fact, Japan's role in U.S. strategy has
evolved over the past twenty years from one of regional ally
to a larger role of global strategic partner. Both roles
have possessed military as well as economic elements and
have emphasized the sharing of burdens in the pursuit of
"largely compatible global and regional interests" 122 and
goals. This is consistent with the broad objectives of U.S.
strategy which include the goal to "establish a more
balanced partnership with our allies and a greater sharing
of global leadership and responsibilities." 123
During the early 1980s the U.S. expanded the focus
of the U.S. -Japan security alliance to encompass specific
responsibility sharing measures rather than mere cost
sharing. Accordingly, American policy was aimed "to avoid
proposing specific programs and to concentrate on achieving
an agreed division of labor between the two countries in
terms of roles and missions." 124 This shift in policy
followed Japan's 1981 commitment to defend its sea lanes out
to 1000 nautical miles and to expand its air defense capa-
bility. That commitment, backed by Prime Minister Naka-
sone ' s vocal support, resulted in markedly less public
criticism of Japan's defense efforts by U.S. officials. 125
With the exception of some Congressional critics, this
approach continues.
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The value of Japanese defense cooperation has been
seen in strategic as well as burden-sharing terms. In 1985,
then Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet, Admiral Foley wrote:
It is, in fact, essential for the successful defense
of Japan and for success of our larger strategy in the
North-west Pac i f ic--which includes, obviously the survival
of South Korea--that Japan play an active role as an ally
in the event of any conflict. It is, nevertheless,
possible that a future government in Tokyo would elect to
opt out of a war. That choice would eject us from East
Asia. l 2 6
While acknowledging the reduced Soviet military threat over
the past two years, policy documents and officials have
recently referred to the U.S. -Japan relationship as "the
critical linchpin of our Asian security strategy." 127
Concrete examples of the continuing and, in some
cases, growing benefits of the American-Japanese defense
relationship include "the geostrategic location of [U.S.]
bases [in Japan] and the cost effectiveness of our presence
compared to anywhere else." 128 Tokyo is already paying "35
to 40 percent of the total cost associated with the U.S.
presence in Japan." 129 Within the framework of the Guide-
lines on U.S. -Japan Defense Cooperation of 1978, Japanese
and American forces have expanded joint exercises, planning,
and interoperability. While the actual frequency of joint
exercises was just recently reduced as a cost savings
measure, Japan-U. S . security consultations have been upgraded
to the ministerial level under a December 1990 agreement. 130
Finally, since 1983 Japan has, under a formal arrangement,
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been willing to transfer military technology to the U.S.--
the only exception to Tokyo's arms export ban. This
mechanism paved the way for FSX aircraft codevelopment and
for Japanese participation in SDI research and development.
Possibly of even greater long-term significance, the
U.S. has in recent years made suggestions that Japan "do
more to help improve stability around the Pacific rim" to
include increased "Japanese contributions to assist economic
development, support peacekeeping, and combat drug traf-
ficking." 131 Such statements imply tacit support for some
form of benign regional politico-military role for Japan, in
cooperation with the U.S., to complement its current eco-
nomic preeminence. A less subtle proposal for an expanded
concept of Japan's defense contribution to U.S. global
security strategy was evident in President Bush's fall 1990
request that Japan provide mine warfare and logistic assets
in support of allied forces in the Persian Gulf. 132
The U.S. -Japan security relationship has grown to
include significant economic and political dimensions as
well. According to Assistant Secretary of State Richard
Solomon:
The security treaty is the anchor of our engagement in the
[Asia-Pacific] region. It forms the basis of the U.S.-
Japan partnership, a partnership which has grown to global
proportions. The world's two largest economies--in terms
of trade, aid, investment, and technology--are the engine
of global growth and East Asia's economic dynamism. 133
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As in the case of military cooperation, the U.S.-
Japan political and economic partnership has been aimed at
global cost and responsibility sharing. In recent years
the U.S. has pressed Japan to increase both the quantity and
quality of its official development assistance ( ODA )
.
Japan is now, in fact, the world's largest dispenser of such
aid. 134 The U.S. has also encouraged a larger Japanese role
in and financial contribution to key international economic
organizations such as the World Bank, the International
Monetary Fund and the Asian Development Bank.
In summary, despite acknowledged economic and burden
sharing imbalances which have persistently strained
American- Japanese relations, the U.S. government's official
stance holds that "our strategic anchor in Asia has been the
U.S. -Japan security relationship." 135 As a result,
"successful management of the tensions in the U.S. -Japan
relationship is essential to sustaining a secure and
prosperous Asia-Pacific region." 136 Clearly, U.S. policy
has been to place the larger strategic value of American-
Japanese relations above what are perceived to be narrower
economic interests. Although such interests have not been
ignored, the U.S. government has chosen to pursue a
gradual, incremental approach to resolve divisive issues
while stressing the importance of the overall relationship
and its intention to preserve that relationship above all
else. Indeed, President Bush recently "committed [himself]
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to see that [Japan] bashing doesn't go forward and that the
relationship goes on." 137
2. Japan as an Object of U.S. Strategy
In the post-occupation period the primary, if not
singular, focus of problems in the U.S. -Japan relationship
has direct y or indirectly related to economic imbalances.
From early fears of the inundation of American markets by
cheap Japanese products to more recent concerns over both
the domination of the U.S. economy by massive Japanese capi-
tal inflows as well as its growing dependence on Japanese
technology, many observers have come to view Japanese trade,
macroeconomic and industrial policies to be antithetical to
American economic interests. These critics are further
frustrated by the willingness of the U.S. government to
pursue only piecemeal and often ineffective solutions to the
problems, and to downplay them in favor of broader strategic
interests. It is particularly ironic, they argue, that the
U.S. continues to bear the main burden for the defense of
Japan's global interests, even as the costs of that
commitment have come to exceed the economic benefits derived
for the U.S. As one critic has bluntly commented: "this is
surely the first time in history that a territory in the
process of being colonized has actually paid for the right
to defend the colonizer." 138
The critics of Japanese "neomercantilist" behavior
and the ineffective U.S. response to them include a vocal
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group of academics led by Chalmers Johnson, policy analysts
including former trade negotiator Clyde Prestowitz,
journalists such as James Fallows, a number of Congressmen
Jed by Representative Richard Gephardt, as well as some,
more circumspect, elements of the U.S. bureaucracy.
Increasingly the American public has come to share the view
of the critics. Especially over the past two years, as
concerns of a Soviet military threat to the U.S. has
declined, the perception of an economic threat from Japan
has grown.
While a majority of Americans still hold "generally
friendly" feelings toward Japan, a June 1990 poll found that
64 percent of the U.S. public believed investment by Japan
in the United States posed a threat to American economic
independence. In the same poll 57 percent of respondents
considered Japan to be America's strongest competitor and by
a margin of 58 to 26 percent viewed "Japan as a greater
threat to American security than the military power of the
Soviet Union." 139 At least two other opinion polls over the
year prior to June 1990 produced similar results in the
assessment of the relative threat posed by Japan and the
USSR. 140 Clearly, the end of the Cold War in Europe, Soviet
perestroika and related developments, as opposed to some
sudden surge in American concern about Japan, may account
for much of the relative decline in perceptions of a Soviet
threat. Whatever the reason, Japan's economic rivalry with
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the United States has, in the last two years, assumed a more
dominant position in the American public's view of the
threats to U.S. security.
The critics of U.S. policy point to a number of
areas in which the American economy is directly or
indirectly threatened by Japan. They cite Japanese trade
and investment barriers, Japan's government/industry
partnership which targets technologies and products for
penetration and eventual dominance of foreign markets, and
Tokyo's macroeconomic policies which discourage consumption
and promote high savings rates. All of these, they assert,
have contributed to 25 years of chronic U.S. trade deficits
with Japan as well as marked imbalances in foreign direct
investment ( FDI ) in Japanese favor. The critics acknowledge
that America's domestic economic and social problems contri-
bute to these imbalances as well. However, they attribute
them, at least in part, to an American budget deficit which
has been exacerbated by the continued commitment of
resources toward defending allies, such as Japan, who are
more than capable of defending themselves.
In general, these critics argue, international
security responsibilities and costs should be shifted to
allies, or where possible in the post-Cold War environment,
simply abandoned. According to one prominent critic of
American policy "peace in Europe means that the 60 percent
of the U.S. defense budget spent to defend some of the
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richest people on earth could be reinvested to shore up the
foundation of America's industrial economy." In Asia, "this
means that instead of the United States continuing to offer
Japan a free ride on most political and security issues, it
must try to shift as many costs as possible to Japan... and
force it to play a role more like that of a normal nation-
state." 141 Or, as one American Congressman has bluntly put
it, the U.S. should no longer permit Japan to hide "behind
the world's most flexible constitution, which conveniently
allows the Japanese to let others fight and pay for world




Rather than downplaying the economic relationship in
the interest of strategic goals, "...the United States must
produce a clearly defined, narrowly focused, minutely moni-
tored policy toward Japan that puts economic objectives
first," while "the American security relationship with Japan
should be downgraded to a supportive and secondary role." 143
Indeed, many critics are skeptical of Japan's real contribu-
tion to American interests in general arguing that "the
Japanese system is significantly different from
Western-style democratic capitalism," 144 pursues different
goals and is unlikely to genuinely change in the immediate
future, if ever. As a result, Japan should be viewed not as
a critical strategic partner but first and foremost as an
economic rival which contributes to U.S. goals only when
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pressured to do so or when it appears to serve their
narrower economic aims. In taking this view, they urge the
U.S. government to pursue domestic and international
economic policies which will restore American global
competitiveness and arrest its relative economic decline.
This approach is sometimes referred to as "economic
nationalism" 145 and in addition to shifting costs to the
Japanese, might include such things as a national indus-
trial policy, protection for U.S. industries threatened by
unfair Japanese competition, and FDI restrictions.
In addition to the economic reasons for viewing
Japan primarily as an object of U.S. strategy rather than a
key element of it, there is also the military rationale.
Although always an underlying justification for the U.S.-
Japan security relationship, the requirement to assuage
regional fears of resurgent Japanese military power has
taken on new relevance as the perceptions of a Soviet threat
to Asia diminishes and the potential for accelerated U.S.
withdrawal increases. Possibly not since the beginning of
Japan's rearmament, early in the Cold War period, has
regional concern been so acute. According to one observer:
Recent defence cuts by the Soviet Union and the United
States in Asia have intensified concerns in the region
that Japan will extend its military reach to protect vital
sea lanes and sources of supply for the Japanese
economy . * 4 6
As a result, one of the increasingly expressed rationales
for a continued American military presence in the
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Asia-Pacific region is to serve as a "cap in the bottle" 147
of potential Japanese military power.
In summary, while the critics of U.S. policy toward
Japan do not necessarily reject some Japanese role as an
element of American strategy, they generally argue that
"Japan's one-sided trading will make the U . S . -Japanese
partnership impossible to sustain--unless we impose limits
on its economy." 148 Without dismissing the need for
American economic reforms, these critics assert that the
threat posed by Japan's "neomercant il ist " industrial/trade
strategy to both the domestic U.S. economy and the inter-
national free trade regime must be "contained." 149 Indeed,
this concept of containing Japan is reflected in the
recently more open discussion of an American role in
checking the growth of Japanese military power. This raises
the obvious question of the feasibility of maintaining an
American- Japanese relationship in which Japan is viewed as a
critical element of U.S. strategy and a major object of it
as well. A question which is especially relevant in a
period of fundamental change in the international security
environment, in which the postwar strategic assumptions
underlying the U.S. -Japan relationship are becoming
increasingly anachronistic.
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C. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES
In the absence of a serious Soviet threat and with
limited prospects for significant Japanese burden sharing,
the overriding importance of the U.S. -Japan alliance to
American security strategy appears to be waning with the
Cold War. There may, in fact, be other strategic rationales
for a continuation of the current security, rather than
economic, emphasis in U.S. -Japan relations. However, there
are also compelling arguments for a reversal of priorities
which place economic considerations first.
One thing seems clear--the intensifying contradiction
between the view of Japan as a strategic partner of the U.S.
(a unifying force) and the perception of Japan as an
economic threat to America (a divisive force) has introduced
significant potential for instability into the U.S. -Japan
relationship. A continuation of the current unstable and
imbalanced relationship may be untenable under the changing
international conditions described above. Any resulting
breakdown in U . S . -Japanese relations could, at a minimum,
lead to massive global economic dislocations caused by the
collapse of the international free trade regime. At worst,
as suggested in the provocative new book The Coming War with
Japan , it could lead to hostile confrontation, open politi-
cal and economic conflict, and even, ultimately, to war.
While the latter suggestion seems absurd, "anyone who in
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1980 dared to predict the collapse of communism would [also]
have been ridiculed." 150
Rather than continuing to rely on a gradualist approach
aimed at resolving divisive issues in U.S. -Japanese
relations, much of it based on the assumption that Japan
will change in response to persistent American pressure, a
fundamental reassessment of the relative importance of
security and economic factors in U.S. -Japan relations may
now be appropriate, even vital considering the implications
of current trends. A critical element of such an assessment
is an examination of the rationales for a continuing U.S.-
Japan strategic emphasis as well as those favoring recog-
nition of the mounting importance of economic rivalry in
American relations with Japan. Reestablishing relative
priorities which are more consistent with U.S. interests in
a post-Cold War environment may provide the basis for a more




IV. IMPERATIVES FOR A CONTINUING
STRATEGIC EMPHASIS IN U . S . -JAPANESE RELATIONS
A number of rationales can be offered for the continuing
emphasis by American policy-makers on the strategic impor-
tance of the U.S. -Japan relationship, even in the absence of
a significant Soviet threat to Japan or East Asia
generally. Among the main rationales are the continued
strategic-military importance of Japan, the strategic
partnership or responsibility sharing concept, the reality
of economic interdependence, and the necessity to stress
mutual strategic interests as a means of overcoming centri-
fugal forces in the relationship. An assessment of each
rationale is required to evaluate its credibility as a
justification for the view that the U.S. -Japan strategic
relationship remains a paramount element of American
strategy and national interests in the post-Cold War
international environment.
A. THE STRATEGIC-MILITARY RATIONALE
1. Japan's Role in Post-Cold War American Strategy
As the Cold War draws to a close in East Asia,
albeit more slowly and less dramatically than in Europe, the
U.S. is responding by shifting the focus of its Asia-Pacific
defense strategy from that of Soviet containment to one of
"regional balancer, honest broker and ultimate security
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guarantor." 151 According to the Defense Department's East
Asian Strategy Initiative, the following major factors
underlie this shift in strategic focus of the American
regional military role:
1. "the Soviet Union, while still the major threat in
Asia, no longer is perceived as the serious menace it
was during the 1970's and 1980's;"
2. in an area of such diversity and complexity, with
little consensus as to the sources of instability, a
regional collective security framework is unlikely and
any "diminution of U.S. commitment to regional sta-
bility, whether perceived or real, would create a
security vacuum that other major players would be
tempted or compelled to fill;"
3. the American "balancing wheel" role has been "a tradi-
tional aspect of our military presence in the
region. ..[ and ] will assume greater relative importance
to stabil i ty . . . as a new global order takes shape" over
the next decade;
4. the U.S. "military presence sets the stage for our
economic involvement in this region" which "has sur-
passed Europe as America's largest trading partner;"
and
5. "by concentrating on the stabilizing aspects of our
regional presence, we [the United States] not only
legitimize that presence, but also provide a rationale
for increased cost sharing contributions to regional
security by our friends/allies [which], in turn, helps
temper traditional suspicion and friction between
regional parties." 152
As the above reasoning suggests, the decline of the
Soviet threat does not eliminate the necessity for a con-
tinued American forward military presence in East Asia.
Significant U.S. interests in the area persist, including
America's largest interregional trade relationship as well
as its commitment to preserve and promote the world's most
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successful bloc of non-Western, free market-oriented
developing states. 153 The benign hegemony provided by the
post-war U.S. military presence, which "the great majority
of Pacific nations [still] openly welcome," 154 is seen to be
a key factor in providing the stability necessary for the
region's remarkable economic progress to date as well as its
continued success in the future.
Thus, while some regional drawdown of U.S. forces is
considered feasible in the post-Cold War security environ-
ment, the Asia-Pacific area, already considered an "economy
of force theater," 155 will still require a forward American
military presence. Significantly, the U.S. -Japan relation-
ship is described as the "critical linchpin" of this
evolving strategy. 156 While this characterization is not
new, it reflects a perception of Japan's continuing
strategic importance to the U.S. despite fundamental changes
in global security and economic conditions.
There appear to be three main reasons for the
persistence of this emphatic linkage of U.S. security
interests to its strategic relationship with Japan. First,
the forward U.S. military presence in East Asia is
increasingly dependent on Japan due to "the geostrategic
location of [American] bases [in Japan] and the cost
effectiveness of our presence there compared to anywhere
else." 157 This is particularly true in the face of the
planned drawdown of U.S. forces in the Philippines and South
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Korea. Second, American pressure on Japan to increase its
military burden sharing "could prove worrisome to regional
nations, especially if they perceive Japan is acting
independent of the U.S. -Japan security relationship." 155
Finally, the U.S. -Japan security relationship is a means of
"discouraging any destabilizing development of a [Japanese]
power projection capability," 159 a sophisticated and diplo-
matic version of Major General Stackpole's assertion that




An unstated fourth reason for the continued emphasis
on U.S. -Japan security ties may be the reality of American
dependence on Japanese-made high tech components of U.S.
weapons systems. This latter point may be a legitimate
argument for assigning Japan a vital place among U.S.
security interests, worthy of a continued defense commit-
ment, but does not clearly require that Japan be designated
as the "critical linchpin of our Asian security stra-
tegy." 161 It will therefore be examined in more detail as
an element of a separate strategic rationale.
There are a number of troubling questions implicit
in Japan's role in the emerging U.S. strategy. Each can
best be examined in the context of preserving the pre-
dominant strategic relationship presented above.
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2. Implications of U.S. Dependence on Japan
The first troubling issue relates to the implica-
tions of growing American dependence on Japanese bases and
host-nation support. As long as the United States accepts
the necessity of a continued forward military strategy in
the Asia-Pacific area, based either on the regional balancer
concept or as a hedge against the latent Soviet threat, the
availability of military bases in the region will greatly
facilitate American presence and operations. Indeed, one
can reasonably argue that any credible U.S. commitment to
assist in the defense of South Korea from a still substan-
tial Northern threat depends on the availability of secure
forward bases in the region.
The importance of U.S. bases in Japan will therefore
persist, if not grow as a consequence of the planned draw-
down of U.S. forces and facilities in the Philippines and
South Korea. While some drawdown will occur in Japan as
well, it is currently envisioned that "U.S. deterrent capa-
bilities in Japan--a homeported aircraft carrier, strategic
lift aircraft, and postured Air Force strike assets--will
remain to fulfill our regional and global missions and to
honor our treaty commitments" over the long-term. 162 Should
the U.S. grow increasingly dependent on Japanese bases,
especially if coupled with larger host-nation support from
Tokyo (currently 40 percent of American costs, increasing to
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50 percent by 1995 163 ), it may correspondingly increase
Japanese ability to influence American policy.
Such a perception, reinforced by the "critical
linchpin" characterization, may, at best, contaminate the
emerging U.S. role as a regional "honest broker." Few
countries in the Asia-Pacific area have interests as large
as Japan's. Indeed, Japanese economic act ivity-- trade
,
investment, offshore manufacturing, aid and loans--already
dominate much of the region. For the U.S. to tie its
Asia-Pacific strategy so closely to Japan implies a
significant measure of support for Japanese economic
expansion (a view that the Japanese themselves have not
discouraged 164 ). In view of the growing regional concern
toward Japan's economic domination, and potential military
expansion in its wake, overemphasis on close American
security ties with and/or appearances of dependence on Japan
may foster a perception that the U.S. is promoting and
protecting Japanese interests rather than playing a truly
"honest broker" role.
A worst case result of U.S. overdependence on
Japanese bases and host-nation support would be Tokyo's
insistence on a say in the employment of American military
forces forward deployed in or supported from Japan. If
these units operated from Japan solely or primarily in
defense of that nation, heavy U.S. dependence on Japanese
support would be wholely appropriate. The reality, however,
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is that American forces in Japan project U.S. power and
influence throughout Asia and are not primarily in place to
defend Japan. 165 Because they operate in a region that
stretches from the Bering Straits to the Bab el Mandeb there
is a strong likelihood that these forces will in the future,
as they have in the past, become involved in operations
which the Japanese do not fully support or which they
out-right object to. If in a highly dependent position
via-a-vis Japan, the U.S. may be less able to ignore
Japanese objections and Tokyo may be more willing to assert
them.
Limiting its freedom of action is not a condition
the U.S. can welcome in a region of such diversity, com-
plexity and sheer geographic scope. As former Commander,
Seventh Fleet Vice Admiral Henry Mauz recently warned,
encouraging Tokyo to pay a very large share of the costs of
American forces in Japan "may in the long run have some
impact on our flexibility. If Japan. . .doesn't agree with
our course of action which is not inconceivable, there may
be some inclination to suggest that the force Japan is
paying for ought to stay closer to Japan." 166 A regional
balancer/honest broker role implies the need for maximum
freedom to maneuver. Overdependence on a single regional
actor does not appear to foster such a position. Past
doubts about the reliability of Tokyo's support for the U.S.
in a global conflict with the USSR167 can only produce more
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serious concerns as to Japan's willingness to support
post-Cold War American involvement in regional conflicts of
far more ambiguous interest to the Japanese.
3. Prospects/Implications for Burden Sharing
A second troubling issue relates to Japan's future
military role. Specifically, is it realistic to expect
Japan meaningfully to increase its military burden sharing
in light of those underlying constraints on Japanese
security policy discussed earlier, and is it still in
American interests to encourage them to do so? Recent
events such as Japan's reluctance to commit significant
financial resources much less a token military presence to
the international coalition in the Persian Gulf suggests
that the limits to American concepts of meaningful Japanese
defense burden sharing remain substantial. For the U.S. to
continue tying itself closely to Japan in expectation of its
greater assumption of the costs and responsibilities of
global or even regional security may be little more than a
policy of "wishful thinking."
Under current U.S. policy for military burden
sharing, Japan is called upon (and has agreed to) "to
increase its territorial defense capabilities and enhance
its ability to defend its sea lanes out to a distance of
1,000 nautical miles, while at the same time [the U.S. is]
discouraging any destabilizing development of a power
projection capability." 168 Specifically, this is to be
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accomplished over the next three to five years through
improvements to "the quality, but not necessarily quantity,
of its force structure through the procurement of advanced
weapons systems, improved sustainabi 1 i ty , and improved
command and control and logistic infrastructure." 169
Some analysts argue that Tokyo remains far short of
its sealane defense goal ten years after committing itself
to it. According to a recent letter to the State Department
from a group of 70 Congressmen: "Defense experts on both
sides of the Pacific agree that comprehensive coverage of
the vast area Japan has agreed to defend requires between 12
to 14 AWACS planes and at least 20 tankers." 170 Japan
currently has neither aircraft in its inventory and is
currently programmed to buy only four AWACS over the next
five years.
Such examples tend to reinforce the assertions of
some critics that Japan's burden sharing agreements with the
U.S. seek only to deflect criticism and are frequently
implemented half-heartedly. Indeed, as long as the U.S.
continues to act as the ultimate guarantor of Japanese
security, there is little reason to believe that Tokyo will
readily assume additional military burdens in the face of
powerful domestic legal/constitutional and political
constraints as well as strong regional opposition. Cer-
tainly, referring to Japan as the "critical linchpin of our
Asian security strategy" 171 does little to induce them to
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challenge the underlying constraints which limit the extent
of potential burden sharing. But, even if Tokyo was to
continue increasing defense expenditures (i.e., more
substantial quantitative burden sharing), or was to assume a
wider, even more assertive regional military role in
cooperation with the U.S. (i.e., more substantial quali-
tative burden sharing), American interests might not be
clearly served as the U.S. security role in Asia changes.
Meaningful quantitative burden sharing, by sub-
stantially increasing Japanese defense expenditures, would
probably not place the significant drag on the Japanese
economy of the 1990s that some Americans once hoped for--it
could however markedly increase the size of what is already
in dollar terms the world's third largest military bud-
get. 172 Such a development, particularly if lacking an
acceptable strategic rationale, would not be welcomed in the
region nor would the arms competition it could provoke serve
U.S. interests. Additionally, it is unclear that increased
military equipment procurement by Japan would significantly
promote American commercial interests by reducing the U.S.-
Japan trade deficit. It is likely, however, that the
political debate over U.S. military technology flows to
Japan would increase and that Japanese defense contractors
would be strengthened--making them formidable potential
competitors to U.S. companies should Tokyo lift its ban on
weapons exports.
81
Meaningful qualitative burden sharing, by increasing
Japan's defense responsibilities, also faces significant
limits. As described above, the Japanese have shown little
initiative to assume greater responsibilities and, where
they have done so under American pressure, have been slow to
acquire the capability to realistically exercise them.
Furthermore, there is little regional consensus regarding
Japan's appropriate security role, even in conjunction with
the U.S. The Chinese, for instance, "seem much more sus-
picious than Americans about Japanese ambitions in the
region, and sometimes appear to regard Americans as a bit
naive about Tokyo." 173 Likewise, "Seoul's 1990 white paper
of defense labeled the build-up [of Japanese military
forces] a 'negative factor' in regard to South Korea's
national security for the first time" ever. 174 Finally, and
possibly the most troubling question generated by any larger
Japanese responsibilities in support of U.S. strategy,
relates to the emerging perception of an American "watchdog"
role .
4. Implications of an American "Watchdog" Role
The third significant concern is the long-term
credibility of a strategy in which the U.S. is perceived by
some to play the role as both Japan's "watchdog" and her
"critical" security partner. If these irreconcilable per-
ceptions of Japan's place in U.S. strategy become widely
accepted, it may only serve to exacerbate underlying
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tensions in the relationship. Indeed, according to co-
authors Alan Romberg of the Council for Foreign Relations
and former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral
William Crowe: "The 'cap in the bottle' imagery invoked by
a senior American military officer [General Stackpole] in
Japan (suggesting the U.S. presence in Japan was to contain
that nation's military ambition) was destructive of
confidence." 175 They do not, however, completely dismiss its
legitimacy:
...the U.S. -Japan alliance does, in fact, ease the con-
cerns of Japanese themselves and other Asians about the
future of Asian security. Above all, it helps dispel the
impression that the United States might withdraw from
Asia, leaving a vacuum that Japan might fill.
Moreover, by remaining so obviously engaged through
the alliance, the United States not only enhances its own
efforts but also facilitates an effective Japanese eco-
nomic and political role throughout the region. Though
Japan's trade and especially its investment is generally
welcomed, there is already unease over Tokyo's potential
dominance in the region. Even Japan's economic involvement
would become more problematic if Washington were seen to
be leaving the field to Tokyo.
U.S. withdrawal would also raise serious concern over
Japan's possible remilitarization. 176
For many Americans it will be disconcerting to per-
ceive that the U.S. must maintain a military presence in
East Asia to check the Japanese military potential that the
U.S. has itself played so large a role in creating, and
still encourages, but now seems to derive so little benefit
from. Equally troubling is the Japanese' own suggestion,
reiterated by Romberg and Crowe above, that their continued
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expansion in Asia including "spreading trade, investments
and economic aid... are actually made possible by an American
military presence in Japan that effectively blocks any
chance of Japan's rearming," 177 an assertion which seems to
place U.S. military strategy at odds with American economic
interests. One cannot help but wonder how long the U.S.
public will tolerate a military strategy which furthers the
economic goals of our primary international competitor,
defends Japan from its own fears of latent militarism rather
than any specific external adversary, and serves to protect
U.S. allies from each other rather than from a common
threat
.
Nor is it clear how long the Japanese public will
continue to "feel good about paying for a watchdog that
watches them." 178 Indeed, a recent Japanese Foreign Minis-
try funded study warns of the potential for "anti-U.S.
sentiment stemming from Japanese nationalism resulting from
trade friction and the receding Soviet threat." 179 Such
rising Japanese nationalism could be matched by isolationist
sentiments in the U.S. if the contradictions in American
interest noted above are not resolved.
Some would argue that these issues present, at
worst, a perception management problem and that the idea of
an American "watchdog" role is an unnecessary absurdity.
However, the DOD has itself lent legitimacy to such a
perception by suggesting that "increases in Japanese
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military strength undertaken to compensate for declining
U.S. capabilities in the region could prove worrisome to
regional nations, especially if they perceive Japan is
acting independent of the U.S. -Japan security rela-
tionship." 180 One cannot overlook the possibility that
some conflicts in American and Japanese interests may be
irreconcilable. Though the result may not be, as one set
of authors has recently suggested, a coming "war between the
United States and Japan," 181 there is clearly some cause for
questioning the continued desirability of American pressure
on Japan to increase its defense burden sharing. If the
U.S. military is to play any form of subtle "watchdog" role
vis-a-vis Japan, there can be no logical rationale for
encouraging the object of this effort to continue enhancing
its military capability or expanding its regional role.
5. Summary Assessment
While the U.S. -Japan security relationship remains
important to the United States, especially with regard to
base access, its central emphasis in the emerging American
regional balancer strategy rests on a number of questionable
assumptions. Without the sort of threat to Japan which once
led U.S. planners to equate its loss to a shift in the
global balance of power, U.S. security interests do not seem
to justify Japan's status as the "critical linchpin of our




First, real or perceived overdependence on Japan, or
overstatement of its military importance to U.S. strategy,
may not serve American interests in the region (if this is
the price of continued base access in Japan, it may be too
high) .
Second, continued encouragement of Japanese military
burden sharing may prove elusive as it is based on essen-
tially incompatible conditions: to assuage regional con-
cerns Japanese burden sharing must be closely tied to the
U.S. -Japan alliance; however, as long as Japan's security is
guaranteed by the United States' defense commitment, Tokyo
has little incentive to risk challenging the underlying con-
straints which limit its security posture and roles. At
most Japan need only make marginal concessions to satisfy
American pressure—pressure which may itself be weakened by
the "critical linchpin" rhetoric (undoubtedly the Japanese
assume there are limits to the extent or consequences of any
pressure the Americans would exert on such a "vital" ally).
Third, ironically, reducing the U.S. defense commit-
ment to Japan, which might be necessary to produce meaning-
ful burden sharing, could also create a more assertive,
militarily independent Japanese security posture that "could
foster arms races and instability throughout the region." 183
In an era of declining defense budgets the U.S. can ill
afford to promote such conditions in a key region already
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described as an "economy of force theater" for the United
States military.
Fourth, the assumption that emphatic official
rhetoric as to Japan's strategic-military criticality to the
U.S. will keep divisive economic issues in check fails to
consider the potential nationalistic backlash from both the
American and Japanese publics created by overemphasis on the
importance of the U.S. -Japan military all iance--espec ially
when both publics increasingly believe its importance is
diminishing and that economic competition is assuming
greater significance.
Fifth, even what may be Japan's most important post-
Cold War military role in U.S. strategy, the value of Ameri-
can bases in Japan to the continued defense of South Korea,
does not justify the "critical linchpin" characterization
for two reasons. First, Japan's support for American
military operations in a second Korean conflict would by no
means be assured (see Admiral Foley's statement quoted on
page 61). Second, any assertion that Japan is the "critical
linchpin" of U.S. Asian strategy because of its importance
to the defense of Korea could only be based on the assump-
tion that the defense of Korea is the primary goal of U.S.
strategy in the Pacific. Such an assumption is not
reflected in U.S. policy statements nor is it supported by
the planned drawdown of American forces in Korea.
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B. THE STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP RATIONALE
1 . The Concept
State Department officials frequently refer to a
global U.S. -Japan partnership. 184 While the "Treaty of
Mutual Cooperation and Security underpins overall U.S. -Japan
relations," 185 the strategic partnership rationale goes well
beyond security cooperation or military burden sharing.
Instead, it focuses on economic and political responsibility
sharing as well.
One key concept underlying the responsibility sharing
rationale is the idea of a "division of labor." It is based
on the premise that the costs of global leadership can no
longer be borne by the United States alone. Under this
concept, which is not new, "some U.S. government sources say
that an effective U. S . -Japanese partnership requires the
military component to come from America, while Japan
shoulders a large part of the economic aid burden that the
U.S. finds increasingly onerous." 186 Some have referred to
this as the "Santa Claus and the Cop" arrangement. 187
Another key concept is the notion that Japan must
"internationalize" its world view and assume "a greater
international role commensurate with its economic
strength." 188 As early as the late 1970s U.S. officials
were calling on Japan "to define a wider vision of its role
in the world--in Asia and beyond." 189 According to this
view, "a commitment of Japan's political and economic
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capabilities to the achievement of major global goals is
essential to a strong U . S . -Japanese relationship." 190
A third aspect of this concept, prevalent in some
academic circles, relates to the vision of some form of a
regional, if not global, "Pax Nipponica" based on Japan's
growing economic and financial leverage. 191 In a world in
which the importance of economic power may be surpassing
that of military strength this concept seems all the more
relevant. Some dismiss the "Japanese potential for hege-
monic dominance [because it] is limited both by internal
shortcomings and external factors," 192 while others argue
that the U.S. must engage Japan in a strategic partnership
to ensure that Tokyo will "continue to play a 'supporter
role' in international politics, whereby it helps to prop up
American hegemony." 193
One writer even asserts that the concept of con-
structively engaging Japan in support of U.S. goals is a
subtle form of containment and is not new. He describes
"the strategy of 'double containment,' in which Germany and
Japan were embraced as junior partners in the effort to
contain the Soviet Union; at the same time they were firmly
anchored in the U. S . -centered alliance system by a web of
security, political and economic ties." 194 In the face of
Tokyo's increasing global economic influence, there are few
advocates outside Japan of a more assertive Japanese govern-
ment acting independent of the U.S. -Japan alliance.
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2. The Economic Aid Partnership
Of the shortcomings evident in the practical
application of the strategic partnership concept, foremost
may be the valid concern that growing Japanese ODA , now the
world's largest, while contributing to economic development
and political stability, "consolidates [ Japan' s ]... economic
dominance in the process." 195 This is particularly true in
regions in which Japan already has major economic interests
such as Southeast Asia. The governments of that region are
particularly sensitive to commercial motives behind Japanese
ODA, especially the tying of loans and the emphasis on
infrastructure projects aimed at complementing Japanese
FDI. 196 Even before Japan became the world's largest ODA
donor there was concern over the quality of Japanese aid,
and this concern persists. As a result, Tokyo's efforts to
tie its aid to larger political purposes, even under a
strategic partnership concept, may not be able to escape the
accusation that its ODA is primarily aimed at furthering
Japan's economic objectives.
A number of explanations have been put forth for
Japan's failure to develop an aid program which does not
appear to be aimed largely at furthering its narrow economic
interests. These explanations include: 1) the commercial
motive--"aid is perceived as an extension of the notion of
Japan, Inc.;" 197 2) cultural factors— specif ically , "that
'charity' is a foreign concept in Japan;" 198 and
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3) structural impediments-- "divided political and
bureaucratic responsibilities for foreign aid has led to
fragmented budget processes and a lack of any overall aid
planning." 199 While Japan has recently attempted to
articulate a clearer, more altruistic vision of its aid
objectives, Japanese officials paradoxically assert that
Tokyo's growing aid responsibilities justify a continued
current account surplus in Japan's favor. 200 Clearly, this
is not the character of strategic partnership that the U.S.
has in mind.
Specific, recent examples of Japanese performance as
a strategic aid partner are not particularly encouraging.
After Prime Minister Kaifu pledged "nearly $2 billion in
financial aid to support democracy in Eastern Europe" during
a January 1990 trip to the region, Japanese government,
banking and business leaders were generally critical because
they "found it hard to support a program that would bring no
tangible benefit to Japan." 201 Later in 1990 Japan, under
U.S. pressure, promised aid to Middle Eastern states hurt by
the economic sanctions against Iraq. Tokyo ultimately
promised $2 billion in aid but this assistance "came with
strings attached, guaranteeing that the money would not be
available for [the rec ipient ' s ]... immediate cash needs" 202
and was not clearly in addition to Japanese aid that had
already been committed to the region. 203 Finally, the
Japanese government has been least forthcoming among major
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industrial countries in extending aid to the Soviet Union
and private investment has been constrained by the attitude
that "the Soviets were offering little in return for Japan
and needed to learn how to do business Japanese-style." 204
As this discussion has suggested, Japan's aid
policies to date have not been entirely in line with
American goals under the strategic partnership concept.
Despite increased aid to so-called "front-line states" in
the East-West struggle, a concept with decreasing relevance
in the post-Cold War world, Tokyo has yet to demonstrate, in
consistent practice, a vision of ODA purposes that is shared
by the U.S. As a result, in promoting the "division of
labor" concept the U.S. faces at least two risks. First,
Washington risks further conceding its global economic
leadership role and influence to Japan while reinforcing the
view that the U.S. is only a military power. Second, there
is little guarantee or evidence that Japan will allocate aid
in ways that ultimately support U.S. goals or interests. On
the contrary, Japanese aid is likely to be used primarily,
as it has in the past, to further Japan's economic goals.
Admittedly, self-interest guides the distribution of the
bulk of American aid as well. It is unrealistic to expect
Tokyo to behave any differently or to assume that its
interests will be identical with Washington's.
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3. The International Political Partnership
In the political arena, there is every reason to
believe that Japanese political actions will be entirely in
support of Japan's interests, with only peripheral concern
for the interests of the U.S. Tokyo has generally conducted
a low profile, noncont roversial foreign policy contenting
itself to follow the U.S. lead when its interests are served
or, when those interests dictate otherwise, to quietly
pursue a different line from the U.S., as in the Middle
East. Japan has, for instance, sought rapprochement with
the USSR far more cautiously than the U.S., pursuing its own
interests such as the Northern Territories issue. This was
demonstrated by Gorbachev's April 1991 visit to Japan which
failed to produce a major thaw in relations due to the
inability to resolve the Northern Territories issue or make
progress toward a belated treaty of peace. Other policy
differences have included Tokyo's effort to normalize
relations with North Korea, its eagerness to restore full
official economic ties with Beijing soon after the Tiananmen
massacre, and its "refusal to play an active role in
reviving the stalled GATT talks." 205
Such differences are not new nor are there signifi-
cant signs of change. During the Cold War, Japanese views
of the Soviet threat were never as rigid as those of the
American government and Japan maintained a small trade
relationship with Beijing prior to Sino-American
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rapprochement. In the emerging post-Cold War environment,
some Japanese are concerned that a U.S. regional balancer
role will involve them in "local conflicts, or internal
political upheavals in countries like the Philippines or
China" that they want no part of. 206
Indeed, during the 1990-91 Persian Gulf crisis:
The Japanese public was generally indifferent to the
crisis.... To the average Japanese, the crisis was 'a
fire across the river '--a problem that was of no direct
concern and therefore better left alone. 207
Of the Japanese government's own performance throughout the
Gulf affair, one leading newspaper, the normally pro-LDP
Yomiuri Shimbun , lamented that:
Japan's poor skills in diplomacy surfaced during the
seven-month [Persian Gulf] crisis. Underlying the
nation's political immaturity was its intellectual
inadequacy in tackling the realities of a changing
world. 208
Two of the U.S. -Japan policy differences noted
above, those related to GATT and the Persian Gulf crisis,
represent key failures in the test of American- Japanese
global partnership as measured by the U.S. government
itself. According to Secretary of State Baker:
The current crisis in the Persian Gulf and the fate of the
Uruguay Round [of GATT] are benchmark issues that will
define the nature of the post-Cold War international sys-
tem. Frankly, America needs Japan's leadership and active
support on both these critical issues, which are tests of
how well both our countries are meeting their inter-
national responsibilities. 209
As one respected international periodical observed during
the latter stages of the Gulf crisis:
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As an economic superpower ... Japan is increasingly looked
to by America to pay the bills and maybe one day help keep
the peace in the Pacific. That one day now looks more
distant than it did. Pay what it may, by its conduct
throughout the Gulf episode Japan has shown that it has no
conception of what is involved in playing even a modest
part as a world power. 210
Clearly, the U.S. -Japan strategic partnership
concept cannot succeed without significant consensus on
major international policy issues. Such consensus is
unlikely as long as Tokyo displays "a much weaker commitment
to fundamental strategic goals that might conflict with
narrow national [economic and political] interests than is
the case with America's other major allies." 211 Indeed,
according to one author, "there exists no sizable number of
Japanese intellectuals, comparable to the Atlanticists in
Europe, who genuinely believe in internationalist ideals and
common purposes . . . .
"
2 x 2
4 . Summary Assessment
In summary, the expectation that the form of U.S.-
Japanese strategic partnership currently being pursued can
be, on balance, mutually supportive and beneficial appears
to be based on weak or wishful assumptions. Clearly, it is
driven by a desire to shift greater burdens of international
costs and responsibilities to Japan. While some forms of
cost sharing may be possible, the practical benefits to the
U.S. will remain uncertain as long as the two nations lack a
common global goals and, most importantly, a shared strategy
for pursuing them. Attempting to use the strategic
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partnership approach to force Japan to embrace a strategic
vision compatible with America's own seems only to




Indeed, Prime Minister Kaifu in a recent Foreign
Policy article entitled "Japan's Vision" asserted that "from
Japan's perspective the key element in this joint effort [to
create a new world order] is the maintenance of close ties
with the United States." 214 This narrow fixation with
bilateralism was evident in Japan's behavior during the Gulf
crisis when:
...Japan had a good chance to share responsibility and
show cynics in Washington what the vaunted U.S. -Japan
'global partnership' could look like. But Japan failed to
understand that the Gulf crisis was about principles and
about a new world order, seeing it instead as a bilateral
U.S. -Japan problem which required them simply to seek to
placate an angry U.S. 215
Thus, while the "double containment" thesis may
retain some validity in rationalizing U.S. policy, a
strategic partnership emphasis may not be realistic,
necessary or even desirable as a means of keeping Japan
engaged in the contemporary international system in a way
consistent with American interests. It may in fact be
self-defeating as it focuses Tokyo's attention on U.S. -Japan
relations at the expense of a larger global view, overstates
Japan's strategic relationship with the U.S., and probably
encourages Tokyo to be less compromising on economic issues
and other bilateral disputes.
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C. THE INTERDEPENDENCE RATIONALE
1 . The Nature of Interdependence
Variations of the interdependence rationale are used
by both proponents and critics of the current U.S. -Japan
relationship. Some proponents argue that interdependence is
a reality of the current international economic system which
leaves the U.S. with little choice but to maintain a close
strategic relationship with Japan and other key trade part-
ners. Others view the mutual, interlocking benefits of
economic interdependence as the most promising basis for a
constructive U.S. -Japan relationship in the future. 216
Critics, however, emphasize that interdependence really
amounts to a loss of U.S. sovereignty created by over-
dependence on Japan and, according to Chalmers Johnson,
reflects a foreign policy approach by some elements in Tokyo
"centered on making the Japanese and American economies so
interdependent that any attempt to separate them would
involve unacceptable damage to both." 217
In addition to over $139 billion in annual U.S.-
Japan trade, 218 finance and technology are the major ele-
ments of American- Japanese interdependence. While Japan's
trade surplus with the U.S., which peaked at about $50
billion during the mid-1980s, has attracted much attention,
it is the American dependence on Japanese financial capital
and technology that has concerned some the most. As noted
above, many argue that this dependence is a byproduct of the
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interdependent nature of current international economic
relations and is a condition the U.S. must learn to live
with. These "realists" believe that because American-
Japanese interdependence has created certain economic
realities which limit U.S. freedom of action in dealing with
Japan, the best option for the U.S. is to hold the relation-
ship together by linking security ties and common strategic
interests. As specific examples, they could cite Tokyo's
$13 billion financial contribution to the Gulf War as well
as the many U.S. high-tech weapons systems used so
effectively against Iraq that depend "...on foreign
suppliers, particularly the Japanese, for a growing number
of state-of-the-art parts and components." 219
Although recent data shows "a reversal of long-term
[Japanese] capital flows to the U.S." during 1990, over the
previous five years $180 billion of Japanese investment
flowed into U.S. government securities. 220 During this
period there was a "growing perception in Washington that
the Japanese are financing much of the [U.S.] Federal budget
deficit." 221 A view which was based largely on the estimate
that 30 percent of that debt was being purchased by Japanese
investors. 222 According to Harvard professor Ezra Vogel:
"Treasury wants no criticism of Japanese trade policy for
fear they might stop buying our bonds." 223
While the U.S. government has recently experienced
little difficulty in selling securities at declining
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interest rates, with reduced Japanese participation in
Treasury auctions "the U.S. could come under pressure to
save more or face higher interest rates worsening the likely
recession." 224 Nor can the U.S. assume that Japan's
declining participation in the American government
securities market implies less potential Japanese influence
in the financial sector. As one Japanese Treasury official
recently warned, "if the United States applied sanctions
against his country. .
.
, Tokyo would respond by curbing
credit to the United States, creating a 'very, very harmful'
s i tuat ion .
"
2 2 5
Technological dependence is also a matter of growing
concern to American defense analysts and officials who have
come to recognize U.S. "dependence on Japan for semi-
conductors and other components of [American] weapons." 226
This situation is unlikely to improve in the near future.
According to a recent DOD "Comparison of Technology Programs
With Military Applications," Japan was on par with or ahead
of the U.S. in 9 of 22 key technology areas compared with 5
areas each for the USSR and the non-U. S. NATO states. 227
Some believe that the U.S. has little realistic
choice but to accept this development and should therefore
pursue "cooperation [with Japan] in [defense-related] high
technology [which] would not only constitute progress on its
own merits but might also provide a model for future
collaboration beyond the realm of security." 228 Although
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Japan's military specific R&D investment is only a fraction
of American expenditures, "the growing importance of dual
use electronic technology to modern weapons" 229 suggests that
Japanese civilian technology developments can significantly
complement U.S. military R&D efforts. Some steps toward
U.S. -Japan technology cooperation have already been taken
including a 1983 military technology sharing agreement as
well as an arrangement for Japanese participation in SDI
research. It is argued that further mutually beneficial
cooperation in the defense technology sector could "set a
valuable precedent for the larger relationship." 230
The potential pitfalls of such cooperative efforts
cannot be ignored, however. The recent controversy over the
U.S. -Japan FSX aircraft codevelopment project demonstrates
the difficulties of cooperation as long as economic sus-
picions persist. Of even greater concern is the potential
for rising techno-nat ionalism in Japan which would use
technology as a weapon against the U.S. As Shintaro
Ishihara suggested in the book The Japan That Can Say "No" :
"If Japan sold chips to the Soviet Union and stopped selling
them to the U.S., this would upset the entire military
balance." 231 While Ishihara clearly overstates the case,
the Pentagon admitted in a 1987 report that "21 U.S. weapons
systems relied on foreign-made semi-conductors ... [and]
listed seven types of crucial military components available
only in Japan." 232 A 1990 Defense Science Board study
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described the American military's dependence on foreign
sources as "a serious and growing problem." 233
2. Summary Assessment
Obviously, Japanese financial and technological
resources are of significant importance to the United
States. However, U.S. dependence on them is neither
absolute nor irrevers ible-- i t is rather a matter of costs.
The U.S. could offset a loss of Japanese investment capital
through either higher taxes, higher savings rates or higher
interest rates. Such approaches would obviously not be
painless--economist Lester Thurow has estimated that the
American economy would need to contract some eight percent
to eliminate its massive, heavily foreign financed, budget
deficits. 234 However, the looming global capital shortage
of the 1990's235 may necessitate some or all of the above
actions
.
Technological dependence can also be reversed.
However, according to the Pentagon:
Foreign products are often cheaper, saving taxpayers'
money, and often more reliable. Officials also contend
that there is virtually nothing the military now imports
that America couldn't produce itself if it had to. But
switching to domestic substitutes would be expensive and
difficult. 236
Even if the U.S. chooses not to pay its way out of
dependence, it should be recognized that interdependence
cuts both ways. The Japanese will invest in the U.S. as
long as the investment environment--favorable interest rate
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differentials and exchange rates, security and stability,
long-term growth potential, etc. --is attractive. When it is
not, they will move elsewhere but not permanently. And
Tokyo is not likely to use its leverage to purposely damage
the U.S. economy. Indeed, "the Japanese need a healthy
American economy as much as Americans do, and most Japanese
government and industry leaders are quick to recognize this
fact both publicly and privately [emphasis added]." 237
Similarly, Japan must sell its technology. As
Japan's largest and most technologically advanced trading
partner, the recipient of 30 percent of Japanese exports,
only the United States can absorb large quantities of
Japan's high technology manufactures. As a region Europe
imports less than one half of U.S. totals and such
comparable sized markets as China, the USSR and India remain
limited in the quantity and complexity of the technology
they can afford and utilize.
Despite periodic Japanese threats to use financial
capital or technology as a weapon, they have shown little
inclination to do so. Nor is it clear how decisive the
impact of such actions would be--in terms of both its effect
on the U.S. and its influence over the behavior of Japanese
businesses and investors. Thus, as with both the strategic-
military and the strategic partnership rationales, there may
be a tendency in the interdependence debate to overstate the
criticality of Japan's strategic importance to the U.S.
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Clearly, the U.S. -Japan relationship is important but the
continued necessity to subordinate American economic
interests to strategic imperatives in American- Japanese
relations may no longer be justifiable on the basis of the
interdependence rationale alone.
D. THE MUTUAL INTEREST RATIONALE
1 . The Concept
The mutual interest rationale is based on the pre-
mise that, on balance, the benefits to both countries of the
U.S. -Japan relationship exceed the liabilities. As a
result, every effort must be made to prevent divisive issues
from causing a serious breakdown in American- Japanese rela-
tions. This can be best accomplished by frequent public
and private emphasis on real or supposed strategic interests
and goals shared by the two nations as well as the benefits
to be gained by cooperative efforts. The targets of the
mutual interest theme are audiences, both Japanese and
American, who question the net benefits of the current rela-
tionship and third parties who would fear more independent
calculation and pursuit of national interests by Tokyo.
Because "the U.S. -Japan military relationship is
working better [today] than at any time since the revised
Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security took effect in
I960," 238 it is most frequently the focal point for the
mutual interest rationale. Official U.S. statements to this
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effect abound, all stressing the same general theme that the
"security all iance . . . is . . . the anchor for U.S. -Japan coopera-
tion," and that it is "the foundation for peace and sta-
bility in the Asia/Pacific region." 239 In addition, "the
security treaty ... forms the basis of the U.S. -Japan part-




The Japanese government frequently expresses this
theme as well. According to Prime Minister Kaifu, "the
[security] treaty will remain an indispensable element of
the framework for peace and development in the Asia-
Pacific ... and , by extension, to the peace and security of
the world." 241 Thus, what is essentially a narrowly focused
bilateral security arrangement with vague references to
"economic collaboration," 242 has become the rhetorical basis
for promoting the theme of U. S . -Japanese cooperation in
pursuit of mutually shared interests and goals.
In articulating the mutual interest rationale
American officials often equate common national
characteristics with common interests. For example:
We [the U.S. and Japan] are the world's two largest
democratic economies, the world's two most advanced tech-
nological powers, and the two largest donors of develop-
ment assistance. Our close cooperation should make the
critical difference in ensuring the successful resolution
of a wide range of global issues. We both have a great
interest in sustaining a peaceful, stable, democratic and
prosperous world order. We have a shared responsibility
to act decisively in ways that advance our mutual interest
in Asia and around the world. 243
104
They also dismiss divisive issues as natural bypro-
ducts of a relationship which is so large and complex,
failing to acknowledge that they may be symptoms of more
deeply rooted contradictions stemming from mutually exclu-
sive national goals. Where differences do exist, they are
often attributed to "diverse" rather than incompatible
interests and are, therefore, always "manageable." Indeed:
Given the complexity of ...[ American- Japanese ] econo-
mic, political and security relat ions--part icularly in
this period of global transition and ad justment--we should
expect that there will be a certain degree of friction and
frustration as well as friendship and cooperation in our
relationship. We should candidly acknowledge that this is
a normal situation for two partners with such important
common responsibilities and wide-ranging yet diverse
international interests and concerns. But we should also
recognize that the strong bonds of trust and good will
between our two countries give us the ability to overcome
problems and misunderstandings when they occur. 244
On more narrowly bilateral issues, the mutual
interest rationale emphasizes the benefits that each nation
accrues from the massive, multifaceted U.S. -Japan
relat ionship--benef its that outweigh any gains to be made by
major, unilateral actions to correct economic imbalances or
by retaliation for unreciprocated advantages. According to
one mutual interest proponent:
This relationship is of immense benefit to the peoples
of both nations. The United States enjoys the support of
a strong, loyal and democratic ally in the Pacific, which
contributes greatly to regional peace and prosperity.
Japan has the protection of the U.S. nuclear umbrella and
enjoys great access to the U.S. market, the world's
largest. The two countries' foreign policies and foreign
aid programs complement each other. Our individual and
cooperative scientific and technological achievements have
brought about a new age of information, increased our
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knowledge of ourselves and of our world, and contributed
to the welfare of all nations. The lives of both peoples
are enriched by a vast and burgeoning network of
educational and cultural exchanges.
In sum, two nations that historically have acted quite
independently have become interdependent. Neither nation
can survive at the current level of economic welfare and
security without the active cooperation of the other. 245
As has been described earlier, the American- Japanese
security relationship is characterized by the U.S. as the
"critical linchpin of our Asian security strategy." Indeed,
according to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Just as the United States without California would be
a much reduced country, America without her Japanese ally
would find it difficult to continue being the leader the
Free World depends on to keep alive the powerful global
movement toward peace and prosperity.
We could do it without Japan. We could still be a
superpower, but we would need to increase dramatically the
cost to the American people and the investment they would
have to make. And there is simply no necessity for us to
expend so much of our national treasure in that manner, if
we can keep collective security alive and well. And in
the Pacific, the key to that collective security is the
U.S. -Japan relationship-- in all of its many dimensions. 246
2. Summary Assessment
The ultimate objective of the mutual interest
rationale is to convince the Japanese, as well as critical
elements of the American public and the U.S. Congress, that
shared security, political and economic interests and bene-
fits override divisive issues which might act to sever the
current American-Japanese relationship. Secondarily, it
seeks to reassure other Asian nations that Tokyo will con-
tinue to act in parallel with the U.S. rather than assume a
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more independent international posture. While the rhetoric
may overstate the case, as the preceding sections of this
chapter suggest, the mutual interest rationale has demon-
strated its viability. Despite growing frustration and
criticism of the relationship on both sides of the Pacific,
the oft predicted breakdown has yet to materialize.
However, this approach is not without its dangers to
American interests.
In nurturing the perception that American and
Japanese interests and destinies are inexorably tied and
"that the United States has no single relationship more
important than our ties with Japan," 247 Washington has
undoubtedly encouraged Tokyo to be less forthcoming when
negotiating solutions to divisive bilateral issues. In his
book Agents of Influence , Pat Choate asserts that the
Japanese have used effectively the threat of damage to
long-term U.S. -Japan relations to face down American
negotiators on several occasions during the 1980s. 248 As
long as the U.S. continues to refer to Japan as a "critical
linchpin" and "strategic anchor," Tokyo is likely to
question the credibility of tough-talking American negotia-
tors and the lengths their government would go to back up
its demands on the Japanese. Indeed, it may be the
undercurrent of protectionist threats in the U.S. Congress
that has provided these negotiators with a significant
measure of the leverage they have rather than appeals to
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common interests and goals. For this reason the mutual
interest rationale serves American interests only if viewed
as an element of a larger "carrot and stick" strategy in
which the administration and Congress, in effect if not
intent, act as contradictory yet complimentary forces.
A second danger in using the mutual interest
rationale to keep the relationship's divisive forces in
check is the risk that centrifugal pressures will build at a
faster rate than they can be relieved through incremental
negotiation and converging interests. This is especially
true when the common interests that are promoted are not
merely overstated but may even fail to conform to reality or
at least to popular perceptions of reality. For example,
Clyde Prestowitz and Selig Harrison assert that:
...the fiction of an essential similarity between the
principles and purpose of the U.S. economy and those of
its East Asian proteges ...[ has been used] to sustain
American public support for the Pacific alliances in the
face of the severe economic dislocations resulting from
East Asian competition. Indeed, uneasiness over these
alliances has grown in recent years with the realization
that America's military allies are economic adversaries
with greatly differing systems. But refusal to
acknowledge that an adversarial trade relationship exists
only adds to the built-in tensions now multiplying in both
the defense and economic aspects of America's East Asian
relationships. More important, it prevents the United




The mutual interest rationale cannot be an effective substi-
tute for a U.S. approach toward Japan that seeks to resolve
divisive issues--at best, it can buy time to do so.
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In summary, the mutual interest rationale may be a
legitimate justification for some continued strategic empha-
sis in U.S. -Japan relations if it is used as a means to an
appropriate end. This will not be the case if, by over-
stating Japan's importance to the U.S., it is used as an
excuse for inaction or restraint both in resolving divisive
bilateral issues and in protecting American economic
interests. Instead, it must be seen as one element of a
larger strategy for reconciling contradictions in U.S. views
of Japan. In other words, it must clearly and realistically
articulate common as well as conflicting interests--using
the former as the basis for genuine cooperation and the
latter as the starting point for unfettered negotiations
which seek a balanced pursuit of American politico-military
and economic interests.
E. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES
Based on the assessment presented in this chapter, the
rationales for continuing to place a predominant strategic
emphasis on U.S. -Japan relations appear either to be less
imperative than they were during the Cold War period or to
rest on ambiguous assumptions. The U.S. -Japan relationship
remains strategically significant but is not as important as
was once the case.
The post-Cold War strategic-military relationship
between the United States and Japan continues to serve
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America's military interests, largely due to the
cost-effectiveness and strategic location of U.S. bases in
Japan, but is increasingly less vital to U.S. security.
Furthermore, the suggestion that the alliance must continue
to be characterized as a "critical" relationship partially
to assuage regional fears of Japanese political and economic
expansion risks a spiraling of American commitment as that
expansion inevitably proceeds.
Washington's attempt to build a non-military strategic
partnership with Tokyo, largely through American pressure to
pursue joint goals, is based on the assumption that the
Japanese share America's international aims and, most
importantly, its concept of the means to achieve them.
Evidence suggests that this is not consistently the case-
Japan has followed the U.S. lead when this benefits them but
pursues its own course when interests dictate. The crisis
in U.S. -Japan relations surrounding Tokyo's contribution to
the Persian Gulf War is indicative of this process at work.
As a rationale for a predominant strategic emphasis in
American-Japanese relations, U.S. dependence on Japan is
also based on weak assumptions. Although real dependencies
exist, they are neither absolute nor need they be permanent.
Furthermore, this dependence is mutual and not so important
as to provide the grounds for the paramount consideration of
strategic interests over economic. Indeed, the past neglect
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of U.S. economic interests has produced much of the current
American dependence on Japan.
Finally, the mutual interest rationale, which may
provide the best argument for a continuing strategic
emphasis in U.S. -Japan relations, cannot be based
indefinitely on American projections of common interests.
As currently applied in most cases, this rationale is at
best a transient approach which can be used to hold the
relationship together while each nation redefines its vital
interests in the emerging post-Cold War international
environment. Any genuine and enduring strategic partnership
will have to be based on these reformulated mutual interests
rather than those which are assumed to exist today. Central
to such a reexamination of interests, particularly for the
United States, must be a reassessment of the relative
priority of its economic interests vis-a-vis Japan.
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V. ALERTS TO THE GROWING NECESSITY FOR AN
ECONOMIC EMPHASIS IN U. S . -JAPANESE RELATIONS
Over the past two decades a number of American critics
of U.S. policies toward Japan have asserted that the sub-
ordination of economic interests to security imperatives in
the U.S. -Japan relationship has seriously damaged America's
international position and its domestic economic health.
Rap ily diminishing Cold War security imperatives since late
1989 have increased the force and visibility of this argu-
ment. Thus, no reassessment of the strategic importance of
the U.S. -Japan relationship can ignore the rationales for
placing greater relative weight on American economic
interests in comparison to strategic imperatives.
American international economic policy has been driven
by two major themes during the postwar period. First, it
has rested "firmly on the foundation of free and open
trade... [and therefore] emphasizes eliminating trade
barriers wherever possible to allow market forces to channel
resources into their most productive uses." 250 Because the
U.S. government attributes the current American trade
deficit to "macroeconomic forces, particularly the imbalance
between U.S. domestic savings--the sum of savings of
households and corporations and the dissaving (deficits) of
state governments and the federal government—and
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investment," 251 it continues to promote trade liberalization
through bilateral and multilateral market opening measures.
However, it also employs a variety of trade barriers when
neccesary to protect American industries from "unfair trade"
and as an "adjustment to import competition." 252 Japan is
probably the major bilateral target of U.S. market opening
and market protecting measures.
The second theme of postwar U.S. international economic
policy, as suggested previously, has been the tendency to
subordinate American economic interests to Cold War security
imperatives. As a result:
Throughout the postwar period, the overriding security
imperative blunted trans-Atlantic and trans-Pacific eco-
nomic disputes. The United States and its allies, parti-
cularly West Germany, frequently made economic concessions
to avoid jeopardizing their global security structures.
Cold War politics in fact sheltered the economic
recoveries of Europe and Japan, and America's support for
them. The United States seldom employed its security
leverage directly in pursuit of its economic goals;
indeed, security and economic issues remained largely
compartmentalized in all of the industrial democracies. 253
Critics of the current strategic emphasis in U.S. -Japan
relations argue that these policies, but particularly the
latter, are not justifiable in the emerging post-Cold War
international security environment. 254 The critics make the
case that American national interests are no longer served
by Washington's subordination of economic interests to
security imperatives in the U.S. -Japan relationship and that
the U.S. may need to compromise some degree of its free
trade principles in order to successfully compete with
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Japan. They cite three main rationales for this reversal of
postwar priorities.
First, some assert that the end of the Cold War has
created a new international security environment in which
"the international position of individual countries will
derive increasingly from their economic prowess rather than
their military capability." 255 As a result, the U.S. must
place more emphasis on economic than strategic-military
interests in general, and particularly in imbalanced
relationships such as that with Japan.
Second, many critics argue "that the Japanese system is
significantly different from Western-style democratic capi-
talism.. .. " 2 5 6 But, in order to obtain Cold War "defense
cooperation," the U.S. has subordinated economic interests
and "embraced the fiction of an essential similarity between
the principles and purposes of the U.S. economy and those of
its East Asian proteges." 257 This rationale will receive
the most lengthy attention both because it has dominated
much of the recent American debate about Japan's economic
challenge to the U.S. and because it offers an example of a
national case of economic interests dominating all others—
ironically, an approach even some of Japan's critics have
advocated for the United States.
Finally, there are critics who assert that "some
Japanese have decided that it is... in the nation's interest
that its savings be used to make the United States dependent
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on Japan...." 258 Rather than dismiss such dependence as an
unavoidable and relatively benign byproduct of greater
global economic interdependence, these critics believe
Japan's growing influence in the American economy represents
an unacceptable loss of national sovereignty.
The proponents of these views contend that the U.S. can
no longer afford to subordinate economic interests to
military-strategic imperatives in the U.S. -Japan relation-
ship. Instead, they believe that consideration of American
economic interests should guide relations with Tokyo. A
more detailed examination of each of these rationales is
necessary to assess its validity in the emerging post-Cold
War international environment.
A. THE ECONOMIC POWER RATIONALE
1. The Case for Economic over Military Power
The rapid decline in the Soviet political and con-
ventional military threats to the U.S. since late 1989 is
generally viewed as an historical watershed which offers
Washington a major opportunity to reappraise and
reprioritize its strategic interests. Those who make the
case that post-Cold War American strategic emphasis should
be placed on economic rather than military interests, a
reversal of Cold War priorities, cite one of two versions of
the economic power rationale. One version views the end of
the Cold War as a seminal event which marks a fundamental
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shift in the American national security paradigm. The other
version, based on the premise that economic power is the
foundation of national security, asserts that the end of the
Cold War provides the U.S. a transitory opportunity to renew
its economic strength and reconsol idate its world power
posit ion
.
a. The New Paradigm
The new national security paradigm which is
emerging slowly but not universally from the Cold War is
based on the central assumption that "the new force in the
world is neither arms nor political ideology, it is economic
power." 259 Some take the case even further arguing that
along with economic challenges, environmental, resource and
social threats to American national interests should receive
higher priority as well. However, for the purposes of this
study, economic interests are emphasized.
Proponents of the new paradigm argue that:
In determining our nation's priorities we cannot
ignore that the postwar period is over, that the United
States in now a debtor nation in a more competitive global
economy, and that a whole new array of economic and
environmental threats confronts us. We cannot ignore the
economic challenge posed by the rise of Europe and
Japan.... And we cannot ignore the opportunities offered
us by the Soviet Union under Mikhail Gorbachev to end the
Cold War and to staunch the hemorrhage of resources to a
wasteful arms race. 260
Indeed, one of the key tenets of the new
paradigm is that:
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...the new world that is unfolding contrasts very sharply
with comparable periods of major historical transition.
Unlike those earlier periods, no major new military threat
is likely to replace the old one anytime soon. 261
The failure to recognize that this fundamental change in
global security conditions represents a "potentially epochal
turning point in our nation's history" risks:
...our nation's future ... being determined by outdated and
wrongheaded assumptions.... We cannot allow ourselves to
stand idly by as our society's priorities are distorted by
commitments to anachronistic concerns and goals. And we
cannot remain silent in the face of unmet investment needs
in our economy, our people, and our environment. The
welfare of our society and our position in the world are
at stake. 262
The solution, these critics argue, is a massive
reallocation of national resources , energy and policy focus
from military to economic purposes to meet "the challenges
that confront us as a nation in an era when power is




They would accomplish this fundamental shift in
national priorities by significantly reducing America's
international military commitments which now "account for
nearly 90 percent of the U.S. defense budget" and, all too
often, a major portion of the national attention at the
leadership level. 264 Resources and policy-making would be
refocused in accordance with a new national strategy, based
on "the needs and goals of the nation in this new era,...
[rather than one] formed more than 40 years ago for a far
different world with far different challenges." 265 This new
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strategy would emphasize economic security goals over
military security considerations in all cases except the
most direct threats to vital U.S. interests and territorial
integrity. Domestically, this would be a strategy of
reinvestment and renewal; internationally it would emphasize
cooperation and conflict resolution through diplomatic
means .
b. The Economic Foundation of National Security
This version of the economic power rationale is
based on the hypothesis of historical cycles of national
power presented by Paul Kennedy in his book The Rise and
Fall of the Great Powers . It is based on the premise that
"if... too large a proportion of the state's resources is
diverted from wealth creation and allocated instead to
military purposes, then that is likely to lead to a
weakening of national power over the longer term." 266
In applying this hypothesis to the contem-
porary American position Kennedy asserts that:
Although the United States is at present still in a
class of its own economically and perhaps even militarily,
it cannot avoid confronting the two great tests which
challenge the longevity of every major power that occupies
the 'number one' position in world affairs: whether, in
the military/strategic realm, it can preserve a reasonable
balance between the nation's perceived defense require-
ments and the means it possesses to maintain those
commitments; and whether, as an intimately related point,
it can preserve the technological and economic bases of
its power from relative erosion in the face of the
ever-shifting patterns of global production. This test of
American abilities will be the greater because it... is the
inheritor of a vast array of strategical commitments which
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had been made decades earlier, when the nation's politi-
cal, economic, and military capacity to influence world
affairs seemed so much more assured. 267
While Kennedy acknowledges that his hypothesis
is not deterministic, critics of American policy contend
that the U.S. has fallen into the trap of military over-
commitment, "imperial overstretch" as Kennedy calls it,
which has historically resulted in the decline of national
power that he describes. America's current debt crisis and
its relative economic decline are indicative of this process
at work, they believe. To reverse it, the U.S. must seize
what is probably a transitory historical opportunity,
offered by the virtual disappearance of major external
threats, to reallocate resources to the restoration of
national economic power. Indeed, "better macroeconomic
performance on the part of the United States is not only an
economic objective but also a growing strategic concern if
the nation is to maintain a position of leadership in
national security affairs worldwide." 268
Thus, according to these critics the end of the
Cold War represents not the beginning of a new national
security paradigm but the return of a more traditional one
characterized by multinational competition for power. While
military capability may remain a tool in such competition,
national power, including military capability, is ultimately
based on a nation's underlying economic strength. This
strength derives significantly from productivity growth,
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technological superiority, and competitiveness in inter-
national markets. The pursuit of these goals, rather than
the preservation of strategic commitments, must therefore
top the list of post-Cold War American priorities even at
the expense of clear-cut international military leadership.
2. Counterviews
The main counterviews to the economic power
rationale come from those who are not yet ready to fully
accept the end of the Cold War or who argue that the post-
Cold War world will experience a regional izat ion and
proliferation of conflict which will continue to seriously
threaten U.S. interests. 269 Those who hold the former view
can point to the Soviet Union's persisting military capa-
bility and assert that it is this capability rather than
intentions alone which must command U.S. attention, since
intentions can change quickly. Thus, the U.S. should not
substantially reduce its military commitments and
investments until more significant reductions in Soviet
capabilities are observed and verified. Indeed, these
critics would point to the crackdown in the Baltics and the
growing influence of Soviet hardliners as evidence of how
tenuous the reliance on intentions can be.
Proponents of the latter view point to the Persian
Gulf War and contend that, even in the absence of a major
Soviet threat, other significant security threats remain.
Thus, military power continues to be the ultimate guarantor
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of American interests which are and will continue to be
global. This case was examined in some detail in Chapter
III .
Both counterviews acknowledge that some military
cuts are unavoidable. They would therefore argue that the
U.S. must continue to rely on its collective and bilateral
security arrangements, despite the end of the Cold War, as a
means of sharing global defense costs. Again, they can
point to the Persian Gulf coalition as an example of this
necessity. In addition, critics of the economic power
rationale cite the continued validity of the Cold War era
assumption that American economic interests and power
ultimately depend on the global stability which itself
derives from U.S. -led collective security arrangements and
military commitments. Indeed, by placing economics first
"the end of the Cold War could sharply heighten the pros-
pects of a trade war," and "the ultimate paradox of the
twentieth century would be a realization of the Marxist
prophecy of an inevitable clash among the capitalist nations
just as the political conflict spurred by Marxist ideology
is waning." 270 To avert this and to continue to deter
economically damaging instability or conflict, the U.S. must
continue placing strategic-military imperatives over econo-
mic interests (since the latter ultimately depend on the
former). Otherwise, America will decline as both an
economic and a military power and as a world leader.
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3 . Summary Assessment
The case has been presented earlier in this study
that the end of the Cold War represents a fundamental shift
in the global security envi ronment--a shift which challenges
many of the underlying assumptions of American national
security strategy. This study has also argued that the
recent Persian Gulf experience represents a short-lived
diversion from rather than reversal of this trend. The
world which is now emerging, while not free of the potential
for conflict nor of military threats to U.S. interests, is
fundamentally different in terms of the qualitative
proliferation of threats to American security. Declining
economic competitiveness and other domestic economic
deficiencies represent threats to the national welfare and
to America's international power base equal to virtually any
military threat facing the U.S. today with the exception of
Soviet nuclear capability.
Whether the post-Cold War security environment
represents a shift to a new national security paradigm or a
temporary respite preceding a return to a more traditional
multipolar or even non-polar system is less important to the
purposes of this analysis than are the implications for the
United States of the shift itself. Whichever the end, the
means are essentially the same. They are driven by the
emergence of an international environment in which, "for the
first time in over half a century, no single great power, or
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coalition of powers, poses a 'clear and present danger' to
the national security of the United States." 271 Thus,
according to the President, the opportunity is presented by
"these changing strategic circumstances" to restructure
America's defense strategy through "deliberate reductions to
no more than the forces we need to guard our enduring
interest...." 272 This represents the initial step toward
the goal of domestic resource reallocation called for by
both versions of the economic power rationale (though it
does not necessarily indicate that the underlying premises
have been fully accepted). Whatever the shape of the
post-Cold War world, the United States must reinvigorate the
broad means of its international power and leadership
through a return to national solvency. According to John
Lewis Gaddis:
The last American president to preoccupy himself with
solvency, Dwight D. Eisenhower, regularly insisted that
the National Security Council specify as 'the basic objec-
tive of our national security policies: maintaining the
security of the United States and the vitality of its
fundamental values and institutions.' To achieve the
former without securing the latter, he warned, would be to
'destroy what we are attempting to defend.' 273
While the economic power rationale does not specifi-
cally address the U.S. -Japan relationship, it does imply
that America's interests should be calculated with more
clear consideration of economic costs and benefits. No
other relationship might be more effected by such a change
in American emphasis than that between the U.S. and Japan.
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However, such a shift in emphasis need not mean greater
conflict in American- Japanese relations. Indeed:
... in a more relaxed security environment, greater U.S.
leverage [created by the ability to defer less to security
imperatives] can lead to a moderation rather than an
increase in trade frictions. Freed from the necessity to
pretend that the U.S. and East Asian economic systems are
the same as a rationale for the alliances, the United
States could acknowledge the reality of systemic
differences and deal with them in a more pragmatic and
flexible manner. 274
B. THE "JAPAN IS DIFFERENT" RATIONALE
1. The Case for the View that Japan is Different
The "Japan is different" rationale is based on the
assertion that:
...the operational realities of the Japanese political and
economic system are distinctly different from those in
North America and most of Western Europe. The Japanese
system is more likely to sacrifice the consumer's welfare
in order to strengthen its businesses. It encourages the
very concentrations of economic power that American-style
trustbusting and deregulation seek to break. When
individual rights and collective well-being come into
conflict, Japan is more likely to promote what it sees as
the whole society's interests. The result of these and
other traits... is a system whose goals and performance may
not be accurately described by the Western model of
democratic capitalism. 275
Translated into international economic behavior, the
effect of Japan's differences is to produce a form of
"latter-day mercantilism" which is in fundamental conflict
with the American vision of a mutually-beneficial free trade
regime. 276 The Japanese do not object to a free trade
system, indeed they depend on it. However, "their own
cultural, social, and political priorities have led them to
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organize and run their [domestic] economfy] on the basis of
principles different from those of the United States." 277
Foremost among those principles is that a high rate of
national savings should be promoted by suppressing domestic
consumption and maximizing exports. One way Tokyo has
contributed to the former is by maintaining an economic
structure which discourages foreign penetration of Japan's
domestic market in order to minimize competitive market
forces. It contributes to the latter through a system which
aggressively targets export industries and markets. The
goal of this effort is economic security through unrelenting
industrial expansion.
Author Karel van Wolferen attributes Japan's
unwavering pursuit of this economic goal to two main fac-
tors. First, the Japanese economy is not guided at the
macro-level by the same concept of free-market forces which
guides most Western capitalist nations. Instead, it is
driven by a bureaucratic-business partnership that:
...has an industrial policy and a trade strategy. Freedom
of the market is not considered a desirable goal in
itself, but only one of several instruments for achieving
predetermined effects that are totally subordinated to the
ultimate goal of industrial expansion. 278
Chalmers Johnson refers to this economic system as that of a
"Capitalist Development State" to distinguish it from the
classic capitalist model. 279 Under this model consumer needs
and benefits are subordinated to the greater interest of
national gain. As a result, while:
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The USA stresses that Japan itself stands to gain from
free trade and open markets, . . .what it means by this--
greater choices for the Japanese consumer-- i s not at all
what the Japanese administrators understand by gain. A
truly open market would undermine the domestic order, so
how, in their eyes, could this ever be considered a gain
for Japan? 2 8 °
The second factor van Wolferen points to is the lack
of a political center in Japan. Instead he argues that the
Japanese political system is characterized by:
...the preservation of a careful balance between semi-
autonomous groups that share power. Today, the most
powerful components of... the Japanese System are certain
groups of bureaucrats, some political cliques and clusters
of industrialists. There are lesser ones, such as the
agricultural cooperatives, the police, the press and the
gangsters. These semi-autonomous components, each endowed
with great discretionary powers, are not represented in
one central ruling body. 281
As a result of this fractured power sharing system, "no
essential political decisions to change the priority of
unlimited industrial expansion have been made..." since a
"...political mechanism for such a momentous decision does
not exist." 282
The ability of the Japanese bureaucratic-business
partnership to successfully pursue its policy of "unlimited
industrial expansion" is supported by the existence of a
number of unique elements of Japan's economy which impose
order on the domestic market and channel resources in
pursuit of "national" objectives. These mechanisms are
either foreign to, illegal, or rejected as interventionist
in most Western market economies. A few of the more
noteworthy examples are described below:
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a. Industrial Policy
The notion that Japan's success has been guided
by an industrial policy is dismissed by some Western
economists who believe that such market intervent ioni sm is
ultimately inefficient and self-defeating. Others believe
Tokyo has largely given up on this policy which did guide
its early economic recovery. Instead, these observers
credit Japan's impressive economic gains to other factors
such a "high savings and investment rates and educational
levels [which] arise from cultural bases." 283 However,
former trade negotiator Clyde Prestowitz rejects this
assertion and attributes these and other means of Japan's
continuing success to calculated government interventions in
the market. Japan's high savings rate for instance:
...did not occur by accident but was encouraged by tax-
free postal savings accounts, no interest-payment deduc-
tions (even for mortgages), no consumer credit, bonus-
based salary systems, and other measures. ...[And while]
Japan maintains low interest rates, which benefit its
heavily leveraged ... capital- intens ive industries,...
consumer loans, if available at all, usually carry high
interest charges. 284
In addition, Prestowitz believes that the
Japanese government has, in effect, rejected the classical
doctrine of "comparative advantage" as an underlying
principle of international trade because "implicit in this
thinking is the notion that all industries have roughly the
same economic and strategic value." 285 Instead, in the
Japanese view, "when the technology concerned is critical to
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the security of a nation's economy, the government of that
country will be forced to take the necessary measures to
develop the industry concerned so that its firms can become
competitive and ensure the security of the country's
economy." 286 As a result, the Japanese bureaucracy targets
promising business sectors "to create an industry that
produces technologically sophisticated products with high
income elasticity and a rapid growth, [ an] ... object ive
[which they bel ieve ]... cannot be achieved without government
intervention ."287
b. Market Share over Profits
Japanese companies are often credited for
placing emphasis on long-range goals rather than short-term
profits, an approach considered foreign to many American
firms (some characterize this as a major weakness of U.S.
companies). According to van Wolferen this approach is not
accidental nor altogether the result of enlightened minds.
Specifically:
...postwar Japanese firms have been strongly discouraged
by a complex of tax and other regulations from raising
capital on public markets with stocks and bonds,
[ instead ]... the members of a conglomerate tend to own each
other. The banks in particular generally hold large
quantities of their clients' stocks; and Japanese banks
have entirely different priorities from Western stock-
holders. Company presidents in Japan, instead of being
bothered by major stockholders breathing over their
shoulders and forcing them to watch the profit charts,
have to worry about the expansion schemes they and their
bankers have agreed on. 288
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As a result of this typical arrangement as well
as the predominance of managers over entrepreneurs in
Japanese firms, there has occurred a:
. . .shift in emphasis from profit-making to expansion of
the firm's market share. In the Western corporate
environment the pursuit of profits and the expansion of
market share are both respectable and are, of course,
interrelated. What has made the post-war Japanese case
special is the apparent possibility, for corporations, of
ignoring profit for very long periods while pouring all
their resources into expansion. 289
This business behavior has provided the Japanese with an
advantage "in the battle for foreign market shares...
[created] by 'economies of scale' achieved through reliance
on a solid share of the home market and relatively high
domestic earnings that often subsidize the exports." 290
American firms, on the other hand, are at a distinct
disadvantage because they cannot "even remotely, match the
financing back-up of the Japanese companies; and, as
companies subject to the scrutiny of stockholders and boards
of directors, their decisions had to be based ultimately on
considerations of profitability." 291
c. The Keiretsu System
In the wake of the U.S. occupation of Japan, the
zaibatsu, which had been incompletely targeted for break-up,
reemerged in the form of economic groupings called
kei retsu. 29 2 These business alliances consist of networks of
interlocking companies formed by major banks and trading
companies. They are "linked by cross-shareholdings, common
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banking affiliations, and the use of the same trading com-
pany to procure raw materials and to distribute pro-
ducts." 293 The system consists not only of horizontal
connections among companies but also strong vertical
relationships between a large manufacturer and its suppliers
and distributors. In fact, there "is a tendency for
manufacturers to make captives of their suppliers and
distributors--relat ively easy to do, because of the weakness
of the anti-trust laws and their enforcement...." 294
The keiretsu system makes it extraordinarily
difficult for an American company to build an independent
presence in the Japanese market especially within an esta-
blished industry. Because the keiretsu linked firms are
tied together by special relationships (both in a business
and a cultural context), there is a sense of mutual
obligation which supercedes market forces. Unless an
outsider is willing to become a part of the system, and this
is very difficult for a foreign firm, it is unlikely to
establish a major market share in Japan. Although keiretsu
type practices violate American antitrust laws, there have
been accusations that Japanese companies are importing
aspects of the system with their U.S. -based operations. 295
2. Japan's Threat to the U.S.
Many proponents of the "Japan is different"
rationale insist that their purpose is not to condemn the
Japanese but to make others recognize the threat posed by
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their approach to international trade. Japan's competitors
and trade partners must therefore adjust their own policies
to take Japanese differences into account, basing "their
plans on the current Japanese system, not the one they hope
may eventually evolve." 296
As evidence of the threat to the world trading
system and to the U.S. economy the proponents cite a number
of structural imbalances such as:
1. the chronic trade deficits between Japan and the U.S.
and between Japan and the rest of the world;
2. the failure of the sharp increase in the value of the
yen to the dollar beginning in 1986 to eliminate
Japan's trade surplus with the U.S.;
3. the one-s idedness of Japanese trade patterns— less
than half of Japan's imports have been manufactured
products, virtually all its exports are; 297
4. Japan's targeting of foreign markets which includes
use of dumping and price collusion to drive domestic
manufacturers out of the market;
5. the export of Japan's business practices such as the
keiretsu system to foreign countries in which local
operations are established; and
6. the lack of reciprocity in its own market which dis-
courages FDI and virtually requires foreign companies
to enter into joint ventures with a Japanese counter-
part if they desire to do business successfully or on
a large scale in Japan.
While it may have been necessary to accept these imbalances
during the Cold War when American military security
interests prevailed, the U.S. should no longer tolerate them
the critics contend.
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As a result, .e proponents of the "Japan is
different" rationale argue for U.S. policies ranging from
protectionism to an American version of Japanese industrial
policy to economic "containment" of Japan. Most agree that
the U.S. must seriously address its own domestic economic
shortcomings--chronic budget deficits, low savings rate, and
mediocre educational standards. Many also argue, however,
that Washington should "manage" its trade with Japan to
protect vital American industries from unfair Japanese
competition. In advocating this approach, they acknowledge
that:
...any interference in trade patterns can impose short-
term costs on consumers. But no society has ever acted as
if having the lowest possible consumer prices was the
highest possible social goal. Developed societies could
drive down prices if they permitted child labor, or
outlawed unions, or removed all restrictions on immigra-
tion, or abandoned public projects like space exploration
or medical research that increase burden on the taxpayer.
To say that a new trade policy might raise prices in the
short run does not end the argument; rather, it should




Again, "the crux of the situation is that the United
States and Japan have fundamentally different under-
standings of the purposes and workings of a national
economy." 299 As a result:
Few, if any American companies can compete with the
Japanese in the areas the latter deem important. The
social and industrial structure of Japan have made it an
extremely difficult market to penetrate; furthermore, the
Japanese government views industrial performance as akin
to national security and pours enormous energy into
ensuring that its industry is the world leader. By
comparison, the United States has been relatively easy to
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penetrate. Its open society makes for an open market that
has welcomed foreign goods and foreign businessmen. Most
important, however, the United States does not view indus-
try as a matter of national security as Japan does. 300
Until the U.S. reverses this view, the proponents of "Japan
is different" argue, America's economy will continue to
decline relative to Japan and others.
3. Counterviews
There are four main counterviews to the "Japan is
different" rationale. While none of them necessarily reject
the premise that the Japanese economy operates differently
from the American, they generally downplay the significance
of those differences as well as the need for specific U.S.
policies to address them.
One of the counterviews asserts that the major cause
of U . S . -Japanese economic imbalances has little to do with
Japan. Instead, responsibility is largely American.
According to this view:
...all Japan's unfair trade practices, taken together,
block no more than $8 billion to $15 billion in potential
sales, whereas the recurrent bilateral trade deficit
ranges between $35 billion and $40 billion. The funda-
mental cause of the imbalance lies in the disparity
between savings and consumption in the two countries:
the United States consumes more than it produces and does
not save enough to build the additional productive
capacity to make up the difference, leading to a trade
deficit that supplies excess American consumption and
inflows of foreign capital that make up for insufficient
American savings. Thus, even the most aggressive
market-opening demands on the part of the United States
would leave the largest part of the problem untouched,
unless there is a simultaneous change in underlying U.S.
behavior toward savings and consumption, including public
consumption as embodied in the federal deficit. 301
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Other versions of this view suggest that America's
inability to compete with the Japanese stems from such
factors as U.S. business ineptitude, conservatism and/or
parochialism, domestic social ills, mediocre educational
standards and misallocat ion of resources (e.g., to military
vice civilian R&D ) . Japanese competition, therefore, is not
the cause but a symptom of the underlying problem--decl ining
U.S. productivity stemming from adverse domestic conditions.
These critics contend that the Japanese are too often used
as a scapegoat for American economic problems, which only
diverts attention from the pressing domestic crises which
are the true cause of U.S. decline. Indeed, this view
combined with Kennedy's "imperial overstretch" thesis is
popular among many Japanese. 302
The second counterview is the virtual opposite of
the first. Its proponents contend that the decline of the
American economy has been grossly exaggerated and that
radical solutions to relatively minor problems, including
the U.S. -Japan trade deficit, are not required. In fact,
they argue, America's decline has not been absolute, and its
relative decline during the postwar period only reflects a
shift back to a more normal position from the unprecedented
and unsustainable dominance of the U.S. at the end of World
War Two.
According to one proponent of this view, the trends
over the past twenty years or so are far more positive for
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the U.S. than many believe:
From the late 60's through 1989, our share of the gross
world product remained at 20 to 25 percent. From the 60 '
s
through the 80's, manufacturing provided at least 24
percent of our GNP, requiring ever fewer workers as
re indust r ial izat ion has advanced. Real productivity per
U.S. worker is by far the world's largest--and 50 percent
above Japan's. In the 70's and 80 ' s , as trade has
expanded, our share of world exports remained at a stable
17 percent. Foreign branches of U.S. companies, far
larger than anyone else's, in '87 recorded more than $1
trillion in sales: four times our exports and seven times
our trade deficit that year. 303
The essence of this view is, as the above statistics appear
to show, that the U.S. is, and has been, on the right
general course and needs only make minor corrections to
solve domestic social problems rather than major changes to
meet the Japanese or any other foreign economic challenge.
The third counterview is that of the free trade
idealists. They believe that Japanese and other foreign
competition is ultimately benef ic ial-- i t provides American
consumers with better choices at lower prices and provides
incentives to U.S. producers to innovate and cut costs. In
addition, interdependence is a reality of the international
economic system which benefits all. The U.S. should there-
fore continue to nurture the global free trade regime,
despite the persistence of some national deviations such as
in Japan, because free trade results in the most efficient
allocation of the world's resources and maximizes everyone's
economic wealth. Eventually, the proponents of this view
believe, even the Japanese will come to accept the benefits
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of free trade and will open their markets accordingly. The
U.S., in the meantime, must resist any temptation to do the
oppos i te
.
The free traders can cite various evidence of the
validity of the argument. First, they can point to the
results of a recent Commerce Department study which showed a
resurgence of America's manufacturing sector during the
1980s, a revival which occurred even as many critics were
pointing to growing trade deficits as evidence of U.S.
industrial decline. In fact, American manufacturers:
...now account for a robust 23.3 percent of the nation's
gross national product. That figure is up from 20 percent
in 1982, the post-World War II low, and matches the level
of output achieved in the 1960 's when American factories
hummed at a feverish clip. The new data put United States
manufacturers on a par with those of Japan and Western
Europe 3 ° 4
In productivity terms "factory efficiency raced ahead 3.6
percent a year during the last decade, about as fast as the
average of United States trading partners, including Japan,
Canada and Western Europe." 305 The spur of foreign competi-
tion, the free traders would argue, was the driving force
behind these positive trends.
Free trade proponents would also assert that
imbalanced trade statistics are deceptive in a highly inter-
dependent international economic system. For example:
If America's 'trade' balance is measured on the basis
of nationality of ownership rather than residency (i.e.,
adding the sales, net of local purchases, of overseas
subsidiaries to the recorded trade balance and deducting
all intra-firm flows to avoid double counting), then in
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1986 America's recorded v i s ible- trade deficit of $144
billion is transformed into a $57 billion surplus. Doing
the same calculations today would probably give America
the world's biggest trade surplus. 306
Finally, free traders cite the benefits to American
consumers of unrestricted international commerce. Competi-
tion and easy market access maximize a consumer's choice,
buying power, and ultimately his standard of living.
Critics would counter that this same competition has
resulted in the loss of millions of U.S. jobs--two million
in the industrial sector alone between 1979 and 1989. 307
These losses can be attributed to foreign imports directly
or indirectly to the automation efforts and the shift of
operations overseas necessary for U.S. businesses to remain
competitive. The free traders acknowledge that foreign
competition can force painful readjustment on domestic
workers but argue that their shift to more efficient sectors
is a better application of resources and provides the worker
with greater long-term job security. They can cite the
continuing strength of the American export sector during the
current recession as an example. 308 Indeed, 88 percent of




The fourth main counterview asserts that Japan's
strength is overstated and that its current advantages are
likely to balance out over time. This is because Japanese
differences are either impermanent or of only conditional
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value. Japan's capital surplus, for instance, has resulted
from a unique "combination of circumstances: abundant
savings, low and falling government borrowing, low and
falling domestic corporate investment, a strong dollar in
1982-85, and, last but not least, a rapid growth in
productivity." 310 It is unlikely that these circumstances
will persist indefinitely. Indeed, Japan's exchange rate
advantage has already declined substantially and there are
signs that Japanese domestic capital requirements are
increasing (reflected in high interest rates and net capital
outflows from the U.S. back to Japan). The decline of
Japan's overvalued stock market and its inflated real estate
prices, both engines of capital accumulation during the
1980s, are contributing to the reversal of Japanese capital
flows. 311
These and other, longer-term trends, such as the
aging of Japan's population and the growing shift of
manufacturing operations overseas, suggest that simple
extrapolation of the growth in Japan's international
economic strength will produce an exaggerated estimate of
Tokyo's future economic power and influence. However:
To say that the Japanese sun also sets is not to argue
that Japan's economy is going to collapse, nor is it to
argue that the force of Japanese competition throughout
industry is suddenly going to vanish. The argument is
that Japan's economy is passing through a phase of
imbalance with the world that will soon be righted,
removing the main source of Japan's growing political
strength. The correction of that imbalance will reveal
the limits to Japanese power; it will not remove that
power altogether. 312
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Another version of this view holds that the Japanese
are coming to understand that they cannot sustain the unique
circumstances (i.e., their "differences") which have led to
so much of their economic success over the past four
decades. To do so threatens to undermine the very free
trade regime which has made that success possible through
assured access to resources and export markets. As a
result
:
Japan's leaders are coming belatedly to the realization
that wrenching change lies ahead. A great national debate
is raging beneath the surface, not about whether change
will come, but rather about how and when it will come and
how it will be managed. 313
4 . Summary Assessment
The case that Japan's economy operates differently
than the classic Western free-market model is difficult to
dispute, as are the assertions that the Japanese system dis-
criminates subtly and overtly against foreign competitors.
The American Structural Impediments Initiative represents
the acknowledgment by the U.S. government that these
differences, rather than some set of visible official
barriers, now account for much of the U.S. -Japan trade
imbalance. This recognition of pervasive structural
differences represents a significant shift in policy for a
government which had for years attempted to open Japan up
one protected market at a time. That this approach alone
will produce effective solutions to the real and perceived
imbalances caused by Japan's differences is by no means
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guaranteed, however. Indeed, while attempting to change the
Japanese has had some positive impact, it has also generated
resentment in Tokyo and has not kept ahead of the growing
frustration in the United States. As a result, "the danger
is that the spiral of rising passions on both sides will
lead to restrictions on investment, tariffs and embargoes,
interest rate battles--the real economic war that people
only hallucinate about now." 314
Thus, it is unclear whether the more assertive,
unilateral action advocated by the "Japan is different"
proponents will be productive. Indeed, the U.S. already
"manages" trade. For example:
...by the end of 1987, fully 35 percent (by value) of the
goods produced in the United States were protected by some
form of nontariff barrier—including countervailing
duties, anti-dumping levies and so-called voluntary
restraint agreements.... The comparable figure in 1980
had been 20 percent. Moreover, the U.S. government
continues to subsidize American industry to a degree that
makes most other nations seem like laissez-faire purists
by comparison. Federally subsidized loans and loan
guarantees, state and local tax abatements, and generous
grants of 'eminent domain' authority are routinely
available to American businesses. Over one-third of all
the research and development costs of American corpora-
tions are now funded by the federal government. 315
The costs to American consumers of these policies are high.
The Federal Trade Commission estimates that the cost to
textile quotas alone runs about $11.5 billion per year.
The value of protectionism to American manufacturers
is also unclear. One can make the argument that the rebound
in productivity of U.S. industry over the past decade
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resulted not only from the threat of foreign competition, as
suggested by the free traders, but also from the breathing
spell provided by the measures described above. Some
analysts of competitive advantage discount this view,
however. They have found that "protection to allow
established industries to adjust rarely succeeds." 316
In any case, what the U.S. appears to require is not
more trade management but rather a strategic focus to guide
its trade policy. National interests, not political clout
should determine which industries are nurtured or protected.
American consumers should not be asked to subsidize jobs
when the cost to do so clearly exceeds the economic benefits
derived, unless the value to the national interest is
unassailable. Furthermore, although threats of trade
sanctions may be effective negotiating cards, they must not
be used in a way that might jeopardize the positive trends
in the U.S. trade position of the past three years.
The improvement in the American trade balance with
Japan is indicative of these trends. Since peaking at $52
billion in 1987, the U.S. merchandise deficit has dropped to
$38 billion in 1990, 317 a decline equivalent to what many
economists had estimated as the maximum possible if Tokyo
lifted all its trade barriers. And, in a reversal of condi-
tions which had favored raw materials, sixty percent of
American exports to Japan are now manufactured goods,
meaning "that in 1989 U.S. manufactured exports to Japan
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totalled $27 bi 1 1 ion--higher than U.S. exports to Germany
and France combined." 318 Indeed, since 1985 overall exports
of American manufactured goods have increased 80% to $316
billion out of $389 billion in total exports in 1990. 319 At
$389 billion total U.S. exports exceeded Japan's by over
$100 billion, 320 making the United States one of the world's
two largest exporters along with Germany, not Japan. While
exports as a percent of GNP continues to favor Japan over
the U.S. at ten to seven percent respectively, 321 that gap
has narrowed considerably and demonstrates that exports are
now nearly as important to the U.S. economy as they are to
Japan. In current account terms, Japan's surplus and
America's deficit are narrowing--both are now within one
percent of GNP. 322
The implication of these statistics seems clear--
more extensive "managed" trade could impose costs on
American consumers and workers (every $1 billion in exports
may account for 25,000 U.S. jobs323 ) which exceed any gains
to be made from protectionist efforts to force U.S. -Japan
trade into balance. This would be especially true if Tokyo,
which is increasing less dependent on the American market,
were to reciprocate. This is not to dismiss the value of
continued pressure on the Japanese to open markets and
eliminate discriminatory practices in general. However, it
does suggest that more radical measures are undesirable.
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What the U.S. needs is a policy toward Japan which
enhances its negotiating leverage without resort to pro-
tectionist measures. Such a balanced American strategy must
begin with a clearer assessment of American interests. Com-
bining pressure on Tokyo with U.S. domestic reform and
resource reallocation, alliance with advocates of change in
Japan, and a reduced emphasis on Japan's military-strategic
value to the U.S. can reinforce and accelerate the current
positive economic trends.
C. THE LOSS OF SOVEREIGNTY RATIONALE
1. The Loss of Sovereignty Scenario
The key factor underlying the loss of sovereignty
rational has been an "historical role reversal" which began
in 1986. In that year, "Japan replaced the United States as
the world's leading creditor" nation while the U.S. rapidly
became its largest debtor. 324 This shift in national econo-
mic fortunes, and the massive Japanese capital flows into
the U.S. associated with it, have led critics to argue that
American economic sovereignty is at risk. Indeed, they
assert, America's growing dependence on Japanese capital to
finance its public budget and private investment shortfalls
is giving Tokyo a dangerous degree of influence on U.S.
economic performance and political decision-making. Most
ominously, some suggest that this is part of a Japanese
strategy to make the United States dependent on Japan and
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therefore reluctant to take actions which might seriously
.jeopardize U . S . -Japanese economic interdependence. 325
Evidence of Japan's growing presence in American
capital markets, in real estate and in direct investment
include
:
1. it is estimated that Japanese investors directly
financed "as much as 30 percent of the American
government's budget deficit" during the mid- to late
1980s. 326 Between 1984 and 1989 this represented the
net purchase of nearly $200 billion of U.S. govern-
ment securities; 327
2. Japanese banks now hold about 10 percent of American
banking assets; 328
3. Japanese foreign direct investment in the United
States reached $70.6 billion in 1989, 17.6 percent of
total FDI in the U.S. 329 As a result of this invest-
ment over "a quarter-million Americans already work
for Japanese employers," a number that is expected to
reach a million during the 1990s; 330 and
4. Japanese investments in American real estate are esti-
mated at about $60 billion. 331
Significantly, virtually all of this substantial presence
has grown from a very small base at the beginning of the
1980s.
The contention of the loss of sovereignty critics is
that the trends which account for these statistics in only a
decade will continue unabated and that the Japanese will be
increasingly willing to use this financial leverage to
influence American policy. Some suggest that this is espe-
cially disconcerting since Japan's interests are bound to
conflict with America's. Specifically:
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This divergence of interests will take place with all
foreign investors, but it is destined to be most
pronounced with the Japanese. In order to pay off its
huge debt and avoid new troubles, the U.S. economy needs
rapid growth, even at the expense of rising inflation.
But the Japanese, as the world's largest creditors, can be
expected to back slow growth and low inflation. In
addition, Japan is an importer of raw materials, and a
rapid expansion of the global economy would mean an
increase in raw material prices. 332
The critics argue that the reversal of America's
loss of sovereignty requires both domestic act ions--reduce
debt, increase savings--as well as controls on foreign
investments in the U.S., managed trade and greater inter-
national burden sharing. The ultimate goal must be to
reduce U.S. dependency on foreign capital, and especially
Japanese capital, as rapidly as possible.
2. Counterviews
The main counterviews to the loss of sovereignty
rationale contend that the perceived threat to the U.S.
posed by Japanese and other foreign investment is either
exaggerated or really does not exist at all. Those who
argue that the threat is exaggerated point out that the
foreign presence in the U.S. economy is really very modest.
They note for instance that the percentage of real American
wealth held by foreigners is a negligible 0.01 percent.
Specifically, "foreigners are estimated to own about ten
percent of the U.S. manufacturing base (including new
additions to capacity), some four percent of corporate
stock, less than two percent of commercial property, and
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about one percent of total real estate." 333 Although the
size of foreign investments has not been overwhelming in
comparison to the total size of the U.S. economy, its rate
of growth during the 1980s was unprecedented. 334 However,
it appears that there has been a significant slowdown of
these trends over the past year.
While the Japanese position in U.S. government
securities was uncomfortably large for a single nation
during late 1980s, this situation has also begun to reverse
itself with such investment showing a net $16 billion
outflow in 1990. 335 However, even before this reversal in
the level of U.S. government securities held by the
Japanese, the amount of American government debt held by
foreigners was not abnormally high:
For example, in 1987 foreigners held 11.3 percent of gross
federal debt as compared to 15.5 percent in 1978. In 1987
foreign holdings accounted for 14.1 percent of the federal
debt held by the public as compared to 19.8 percent in
1978. In general the percentage of federal debt held by
foreigners rose during the 1970s and declined during the
1980s. 336
The other, even more optimistic, counterview holds
that the massive flow of foreign investment into the U.S.
was not a problem but a boon. What this inflow reflected
was the growing interdependence of global capital markets
and the natural tendency of funds to move into the most
productive investments. During the 1980s those investments
were in the United States. 337 Indeed, America's persistent
current account deficit has reflected the desire of
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foreigners to invest in the U.S. rather than buy its pro-
ducts. In fact, "a per capita comparison shows that [the
U.S. and Japan] each buys about the same amount from the
other: in 1987, $374 in U.S. imports from Japan per capita,
and $360 in Japanese imports from the United States." 338
Not surprisingly, the Japanese would rather invest their
surplus in the U.S. rather than buy more goods. These
investments contribute to American productivity improvements
and economic growth. Indeed, "since the commencement of our
trade deficit in the first quarter of 1983 [through 1988],
the United States has created over 15 million jobs net" 339
(though critics of this rosy view would assert that the
majority of these jobs were in the low skill, low pay
service sector).
In addition to these points, those who minimize the
significance of America's massive foreign borrowing argue
that the U.S. debtor status is based on the "book" vice
"market" value of America's own foreign investments340
,
that
temporary demographic trends rather than permanent condi-
tions caused the decline in U.S. savings over the past
decade341
, and that "business saving during the 1980's off-
set the fall in the personal saving rate." 342 In sum,
America's growing dependence on foreign debt during the
1980s was not a negative trend and, in any case, is likely




As discussed in Chapter IV, America's dependence on
foreign capital is not an inescapable condition. Indeed,
during 1990 Japanese participation in U.S. treasury auctions
declined. This was due to rising interest rates in Japan
even as America's were falling, a diminishing Japanese
current account surplus, and falling land and stock prices
which have "stripped Japanese companies of the means to
raise capital needed for investment, thereby increasing
domestic demand for capital and reducing the amount of money
that otherwise might flow to the United States." 343 It also
reflects the weakness in the U.S. economy which has reduced
the demand for domestic capital outside the public sector
and has caused interest rates to decline. As a result of
these recent factors, "Japan's long-term capital outflow
[which had] peaked at $136.5 billion in 1987,... fell to
$43.5 billion last year," 344 and, as noted above, Japanese
investment in U.S. Treasury securities also reversed itself
in 1990.
Japanese FDI in the U.S. has continued to grow, how-
ever concerns about its impact are probably exaggerated as
well. Japan remains the second largest direct investor in
the U.S. behind Britain though its investments are often far
more visible to the public. Many of the complaints about
cultural differences which have been leveled against the
Japanese also followed American multinationals overseas
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during their early years of international expansion and were
eventually resolved. Accusations that Japanese companies
are importing the keiretsu system into the U.S. are being
investigated and where verified are likely to be subjected
to American antitrust actions. Finally, FDI provides long-
term capital investment, jobs and technology transfers to
the U.S.
The concern that Japan has the ability to use its
financial clout to influence U.S. policy also appears to be
exaggerated. Indeed, America's continued emphasis on the
strategic importance of U.S. -Japan relations may be a larger
factor in any American reluctance to press Tokyo too hard on
trade issues. It may also be a more relevant explanation
for the Japanese tendency to stonewall in negotiations with
the U.S. or accept and then selectively ignore the terms of
bilateral trade agreements (though Japan's growing self-
confidence is a factor too).
Thus, although persistent heavy dependence on short-
term foreign capital, especially when one nation's capital
predominates, is probably not healthy, there are growing
indications that this is not a permanent position for the
U.S. In fact, had Washington been willing to accept the
costs of reducing its need for foreign capital, this
situation could have been reversed earlier.
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D. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES
As this assessment has attempted to show, American
approaches to the Japanese economic challenge have been
inappropriate for two distinct reasons. First, the approach
of successive administrations has been to subordinate
economic interests to security imperatives in U.S. -Japan
relations. Although efforts to open Japanese markets and to
protect American industries have been pursued, they have
often failed to have the desired effect. Indeed, although
it is difficult to prove, it could be asserted that the
failure to press negotiations and agreements through to
satisfactory conclusions is the result of a consistent
tendency to avoid taking actions on economic issues which
might harm the larger strategic relationship. This
subordination of economic interests may no longer be
justifiable in a post-Cold War world in which economic power
is of growing importance. Indeed, if the U.S. is to retain
the military capability which is required to protect its
interests in what could be a more fragmented international
environment, it must take the actions necessary to restore
the vibrant domestic economy upon which such military power
must ultimately be based.
Although the critics of U.S. policy toward Japan have
long advocated a greater emphasis on economic interests,
their approach has been based on overstated assumptions or
has advocated solutions which would not clearly serve
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American interests over the long-term. It is difficult to
refute the argument that Japan is different and presents a
singular economic challenge to the United States. However,
restrictive or protectionist policies are unlikely to be the
solutions which will reverse America's relative economic
decline vis-a-vis Japan. Instead, the U.S. must vigorously
pursue its economic interests through a combination of
pressures on Japan to open its system and domestic efforts
to improve the competitiveness of American industries. The
former approach would be significantly enhanced by the
leverage which could be gained from a greater emphasis on
economic interests and a corresponding attenuation of
strategic imperatives in the U.S. -Japan relationship. While
recent trends in the American- Japanese economic balance have
been positive, the short-term influence of the U.S.
recession cannot be discounted. Indeed, complacency should
not divert attention from the opportunity to reinforce these
trends through changes in American policy.
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VI. CONCLUSION: KEEPING STRATEGY AND ECONOMICS IN BALANCE
A. OVERALL ASSESSMENT
This thesis has sought to examine the ambiguities posed
by conflicting American views of Japan's role in U.S.
national security strategy—strateg ic ally and economic
adversary— and the relative weight which U.S. policy should
devote to each. Based on the analysis of post-Cold War
American interests presented here, one can conclude that
Japan is neither as strategically important an ally today as
it was during the Cold War nor is it the economic threat
that some imagined during the height of U. S . -Japanese
economic imbalances in the late 1980s. Unfortunately, the
polarization of American views of Japan persist, threatening
to cleave the mutually beneficial, if still asymmetrical,
U.S. -Japan relationship. Avoiding such an undesirable
breakdown in relations must begin with a more realistic
articulation of U.S. interests vis-a-vis Japan.
The emerging post-Cold War environment in East Asia
offers an unprecedented opportunity to reassess American
strategic interests in the region. While the U.S. retains
significant security interests and a military role in the
area, Japan's once overriding strategic importance to those
interests and that role has diminished for reasons discussed
in detail in Chapter IV. Furthermore, during the past
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decade and particularly as the Soviet threat has faded,
American economic interests have come to dominate the
national debate over American strategy in Asia. No
bilateral relationship and its role in American national
security strategy has received more scrutiny than that
between the United States and Japan. Indeed, in no other
relationship has the perceived conflict between American
strategic and economic interests been so acute. For-
tuitously, the end of the Cold War appears to offer the
opportunity to close this strategic perception gap--not
because the choice between one view or the other is now
possible, but because converging American strategic and
economic interests may make such a choice unnecessary if
U.S. policy is modified accordingly.
Since the late 1960s when contradictory views of
Japan became a subject of debate, and through the subsequent
period of intensifying polarity between these views, the
U.S. government has consistently subordinated divisive
economic issues to strategic imperatives in the U.S. -Japan
relationship. Indeed, this prioritization of interests
characterized American policy throughout the Cold War.
During that period of persistent Soviet threat to U.S.
national security, this approach to American- Japanese
relations was justifiable despite its apparent economic
costs. The end of the Cold War undermines the rationale for
this subordination of economic interests to military
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security considerations in the U.S. -Japan relationship.
Thus far, however, American strategic emphasis continues to
favor military rather than economic interests. The con-
tinued reliance on Cold War assumptions and rhetoric as a
means of overcoming divisive economic issues only serves to
perpetuate the polarization of U.S. views of Japan.
Furthermore, since the underlying strategic rationales which
have legitimized the subordination of economics to mili-
tary security are less obvious and defensible, the
credibility of this approach may be difficult, if not
impossible, to maintain. Indeed, perpetuating the
polarization of views even as the credibility of the
centripetal view wanes may place the relationship on a more
fragile footing than at any time in the postwar period.
This is particularly unfortunate since the current
approaches for responding to Japan's economic challenge--
administrat ion emphasis on strategy over economics and
Congress's orientation towards retaliation or
protect ionism--appear to be losing some of their efficacy as
well. Thus, the opportunity to reconcile the conflicting
American views of Japan may never be better than it is
today .
In the emerging post-Cold War security environment, the
central element of any effort to reconcile American views
and to restabilize U.S. -Japan relations must be a more
balanced consideration of U.S. interests vis-a-vis Japan.
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Specifically, this means that economic interests must be
given at least equal consideration with strategic matters--a
shift in emphasis which the end of the Cold War allows, even
demands. Such a change in relative priorities will give the
U.S. greater flexibility in its relations with Japan and
will alleviate the need to maintain the fiction that the
Japanese, as allies, share the same strategic world view as
the United States. The relationship can then be redefined
on the basis of real rather than projected mutual interests.
It will also force both sides to face up to and come to
terms with diverging interests before those differences form
the roots of unresolvable conflicts. In sum, Washington can
no longer persist in subordinating non-military interests in
the U.S. -Japan relationship any more than Tokyo can continue
ignoring those non-economic interests which the United
States has too frequently relieved it of responsibility for.
Based on this general assessment of the U.S. -Japan
relationship in the emerging post-Cold War era, the
following specific policy recommendations are provided. The
objective of these recommendations is to serve U.S. national
interests more effectively while seeking to establish a more
stable and enduring basis for American- Japanese relations.
It should be noted that none of these recommendations
provide neat, easy solutions, indeed some might cause
near-term perturbations in bilateral relations because they
require aggressively confronting divisive issues or
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abandoning long-held strategic assumptions. However, over
the long-term they could produce a more balanced and durable
re lat ionsh i p
.
B. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
1 . Stress Mutual Interests in the Post-Cold War Order
The U.S. must develop a new set of national
priorities for the post-Cold War world. As has been
suggested, this should include, at a minimum, the elevation
of economic interests to a level at least equal to military
security considerations. In the new international security
environment which is emerging the U.S. could look to Japan's
loosely articulated though never fully implemented
"comprehensive security strategy" as a model for its own
national strategy. Japan, one group of its prominent
critics note, "has been admirably clearheaded about its
economic interests." 345 The U.S. must follow suit.
While such an effort will require changes in
American foreign policy, it will also necessitate urgent
domestic reform and resource reallocation. Although
specific recommendations for such actions are beyond the
scope of this study, it should be noted that they must
include, not only the reallocation of military resources
suggested earlier, but also the restructuring of America's
grossly inefficient and largely unproductive social welfare
system as well as educational reforms and solutions to
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pressing public health crises. Indeed, if U.S. efforts to
foster change in Japan are to succeed, they must be
accompanied by credible reform measures at home.
After redefining and articulating its national
interests and goals in the post-Cold War world, the U.S. can
reassess its shared interests with Japan. These will cer-
tainly include Third World development and stability, non-
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, conventional
arms control, freedom of transit in international waterways,
technological cooperation aimed at eliminating environmental
threats and sources of conflict caused by dwindling natural
resources, mutual efforts to increase the security of the
world's food supply, and leadership in international
initiatives to accomplish these and other goals.
The Japanese must conduct the same form of reassess-
ment as the U.S., though this will likely be a slower pro-
cess. However, the most enduring and productive U.S. -Japan
partnership will be one which produces freely entered
cooperative efforts based on the overlapping interests of
separately conceived national strategies. It will not
result from a partnership based on Japan being prodded to
follow and finance America's strategic vision, and then
doing so when that is easy or when the threat to the
bilateral relationship exceeds the benefits of taking its
own course. This type of partnership, based on the fiction
of a shared vision, can only produce tension, disappointment
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and accusations of bad faith on both sides. Indeed, the
mounting frustration which characterizes U.S. -Japan
relations today largely reflects the continued reliance on a
projection of mutual security interests which were based on
now less relevant strategic assumptions.
2. Seek a Multilateral Commitment to Regional Stability
Despite regional diversity which works against a
formal multinational alliance structure in the Asia-Pacific
region or even an informal framework equivalent to the Con-
ference on Security and Cooperation in Europe ( CSCE ) , the
U.S. should seek a non-binding, non-specific multilateral
commitment to regional stability and conflict resolution
through peaceful means. This commitment would not need to
include all regional parties though its legitimacy would be
enhanced by maximum participation including that of the PRC
and the USSR. Such an agreement might represent little more
in practice than a general statement of principles based on
the provisions of the United Nations charter. However, it
would provide the U.S. with a loosely defined, flexible
rationale to support its continued "regional balancer"
presence in Asia--i.e., that its presence enhances the goals
of stability and conflict deterrence expressed in the
agreement
.
Using this general commitment to stability as the
operative basis for America's Asian presence, the U.S. -Japan
relationship could be viewed as an element of that larger
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strategic concept rather than the "critical linchpin" of
American strategy. This shift in American emphasis would
lend greater credibility to the "honest broker" element of
the new strategy by disassociating the U.S. from inimical
Japanese goals. It would also allow Washington greater
flexibility in dealing with divisive bilateral issues in its
relationship with Japan as well as in its pursuit of U.S.
regional interests.
3. Maintain the American Nuclear Umbrella
Japan's inclusion under the American nuclear
umbrella should be maintained to discourage nuclear pro-
liferation there and elsewhere in the region. However, the
U.S. should play down its role in the conventional defense
of Japan by emphasizing Tokyo's sovereign defense respon-
sibilities as well as the lack of meaningful threats to
Japan. The latter emphasis would be used to restrain any
tendency of the former to promote continued rearmament
beyond that which will be described in recommendation six
below
.
4. Maintain the Security Treaty
While retaining the U.S. -Japan Security Treaty as a
means of reassuring both Japan's neighbors and the Japanese
themselves, the U.S. should downplay Tokyo's importance in
America's Asian strategy. Despite new strategic conditions
which render the U.S. -Japan Mutual Security Treaty less
relevant, any move to abrogate or renegotiate it would
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introduce unnecessary uncertainty during a period of
potentially destabilizing international transition. The
asymmetric character of the treaty is now far less signifi-
cant an issue than is its symbolic value as a commitment to
preserving the larger relationship and regional stability.
And, although the presence of U.S. bases in Japan is not
formally dependent on the treaty, the legitimacy of their
presence is certainly associated with it. This does not
mean that the security treaty should remain the centerpiece
of the U.S. -Japan relationship or of America's Asian
strategy, however.
Indeed, the U.S. must recognize and accept that some
of Japan's underlying interests in maintaining the security
al 1 iance-- for instance, as a means to legitimize its eco-
nomic and political expansion in Asia--differ from those of
the U.S., which are to preserve regional stability and
American influence through continued military presence. The
United States can avoid association with inimical Japanese
motives by ceasing to overemphasize Japan's strategic
military importance to the U.S. as "the critical linchpin of
our Asian security strategy." 346 Instead, the U.S. -Japan
military relationship should be viewed as one element, not
the central element, of America's Asian security interests.
As suggested earlier, this de-emphasis of Tokyo's strategic
importance could provide the U.S. with greater leverage and
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flexibility in pursuing its economic interests and in
resolving divisive issues related to those interests.
5. Retain Bases in Japan as Long as Mutually Desired
Tn view of the operational convenience and cost-
effectiveness of Japanese bases, the U.S. should maintain a
forward deployed military presence in Japan in support of
its regional balancer role as long as it serves American
interests and is welcomed by Tokyo. However, considering
the possible loss of permanent bases in the Philippines and
key facilities in South Korea, Washington should minimize
any resulting overdependence on Tokyo by maintaining or
seeking base access rights, with or without a permanent
presence, elsewhere in the region. The recently negotiated
arrangement with Singapore might be an appropriate model for
such efforts. In any case, the U.S. should also limit
Japanese host-nation contributions to non-operational
support costs in order to minimize any real or perceived
Japanese ability to influence U.S. military operations and
policies in the region.
In attempting to maintain existing or to obtain new
base access rights in the region, the U.S. should avoid
permanent presences in nations, such as the Philippines,
where nationalistic forces overshadow the mutual interests
which are essential to a stable, enduring security rela-
tionship. For this very reason, the U.S. must resolve
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rather than continue downplaying divisive issues in its
relationship with Japan.
6. Disavow a Watchdog Role and Minimize Burden Sharing
While the U.S. should not lend legitimacy to its
emerging role of tacit lid on Japan's military power, Ameri-
can interests are served by discouraging further Japanese
rearmament, quantitative or qualitative. Due to a variety
of constraints, Tokyo's potential for meaningful burden
sharing appears to be marginal and further JSDF rearmament
or mission expansion not only risks an Asian arms race
directed against Japan but also encourages Japanese
nationalists to advocate a more independent and aggressive
security position as American military presence in Asia
diminishes. For the U.S. to attempt to temper these
tendencies by acting overtly as Japan's "watchdog" would
ultimately be destructive of the confidence and mutual
interest upon which the relationship must be based if it is
to endure.
However, in an "economy of force theater" the U.S.
can ill afford to stimulate arms proliferation even among
allies, especially if it is directed at each other.
Furthermore, the strategic and economic benefits to the U.S
of continued Japanese rearmament are marginal, if not
detrimental due to the technology transfer to Japan
resulting from coproduction arrangements. Thus, the United
States should attempt to preserve Japanese quantitative and
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qualitative inferiority in defense forces as a hedge against
arms proliferation or, in the worst case, an acrimonious
breakdown in U.S. -Japan relations. Maintaining current
Japanese force levels and capabilities should be encouraged,
along with only a modest rate and quality of replacement and
technological modernization. This U.S. policy approach
should be maintained until there developments a regional
consensus as to the proper extended security role to be
played by Tokyo.
7. Modify the Bilateral Strategic Partnership Approach
The United States should modify the bilateral
strategic partnership approach to U.S. -Japan relations.
Specifically, Japan should be drawn into larger leadership
roles in international bodies and encouraged to channel its
financial assistance through international organizations
which will distribute aid without regard to Japanese
economic interests. Indeed, for Tokyo to play a meaningful
leadership role in international affairs, it must do more
than just participate in response to American pressure, it
must develop and pursue its own vision of a world role.
Pressing Japan to exercise such a role mostly in the
context of a bilateral partnership with the U.S. has led the
Japanese leadership to view its international responsi-
bilities as largely a matter of maintaining good bilateral
relations with Washington. U.S. emphasis on the "division
of labor" concept has conditioned Japan to view the world in
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terras of narrow national economic interests rather than any
broader strategic goals which engender trade-offs and
compromises to serve larger needs. Some contend that
Japanese cultural values militate against the development of
such an outer-directed strategic view; if this is so,
continued reinforcement of a largely inner-directed view
does not serve either American or Japanese interests over
the long-term. Indeed, if Japan fails to establish an
acceptable global role it may find itself the target of
containment and isolation by those who fear its single-
minded pursuit of national goals.
8. Reduce U.S. Financial and High Tech Dependence
The U.S. must reduce its dependence on Japanese
capital through budget balancing and other macroeconomic
policy efforts. In view of current positive trends,
restrictive actions aimed at Japan are unnecessary and would
likely be self-defeating economically.
American dependence on Japanese high technology can
be ameliorated by establishing a national high-tech compo-
nents stockpile as a hedge against supply interruptions.
However, as a longer term solution, Washington should
encourage through incentives or require by regulation that
Japanese high-tech manufacturers build critical weapons
components in the U.S. using American suppliers whenever
possible. The U.S. government should also shift R&.D
subsidies to American companies outside the defense sector
164
which develop and manufacture dual-use high technology
components
.
9. Resolve Trade Issues
Washington must aggressively seek favorable resolu-
tions to divisive U.S. -Japan trade issues and economic
imbalances created by unreciprocated advantages. The tools
of such an effort should include:
a. Create a Department of International Trade
The creation of a cabinet level Department of
International Trade would demonstrate the elevation in
priority of international economic security considerations
in American foreign policy. 347 The responsibilities of this
new organization would include: international trade policy-
making and negotiation; investigation of and response to
discrimination against U.S. companies abroad as well as
violation of American laws and GATT regulations by foreign
companies exporting to or operating in the U.S.; coordina-
tion with the Pentagon and other departments on decisions
related to export controls and protection of American
industries vital to national security; cost-benefit analyses
of protectionist measures and other import controls; and,
designation of high technology and other critical business
sectors where government resources can be applied to esta-
blish or maintain U.S. competitiveness (but government
involvement should emphasize incentives and indirect sub-
sidies such as education, R&D and infrastructure
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improvements, not protectionism, direct subsidies or
noncompetitive business cooperation348 ).
Most importantly, the Department would draft a
national trade and competitiveness strategy, equal in
importance to the national military strategy, which would
provide a strategic framework for guiding American trade
policy. All existing and proposed protectionist measures
would be evaluated in terms of their contribution to this
strategy. Although the Department would be committed to
free trade principles, it would place national economic
considerations f irst--balancing the interests of consumers,
producers, workers and the national security in the broadest
sense. However, competitiveness improvements would be
stressed over protection except when national interests or
economic benefits clearly dictated otherwise.
b. Negotiating Strategy toward Japan
As an element of a comprehensive trade strategy,
U.S. policy toward Japan would stress reciprocity and
balance. Unfettered by the need to place military-strategic
imperatives first and guided by the trade strategy described
above, the policy would place American economic, competi-
tiveness and technology interests on par with other
considerations. It would avoid policies which harmed
American consumers or protected U.S. companies irom healthy
competition. However, it would aggressively seek recipro-
city and fairness for American producers and exporters.
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Although overbearing efforts to change the
Japanese would not be stressed, the U.S. could actively seek
allies in Japan among those groups who advocate domestic
changes which favor American interests. Indeed, Japanese
polls have shown "that a majority of Japanese understand
that their interests are championed by an American govern-




Where the Japanese resist change due to powerful
political constituencies or cultural preferences, the U.S.
should demand equal opportunities for American companies to
participate in the Japanese system on its terms. U.S. firms
will be more willing to adapt to foreign business practices
if they believe they will be given a reasonable chance to
succeed. In addition, market opening commitments and other
agreements with the Japanese government should include clear
measures of reciprocity and automatic, mandatory sanctions
for compliance failures. This would place responsibility
for American imposed sanctions on the Japanese themselves
not the U.S.
Import protection measures which heavily
penalize American consumers should be avoided. Instead, as
Japanese manufacturing operations grow in the U.S. they
should be targeted for retaliatory actions such as domestic
content and local management regulations, mandatory joint
ventures with U.S. companies which stipulate minimum
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technology sharing and management control requirements, and
even FDI or market share reciprocity guarantees for U.S.
companies attempting to enter the Japanese market. Indeed,
the threat of such measures might lead Japanese firms with
large investments in the U.S. to bring pressure on their own
government for change. 350
Above all, the American government should stop
encouraging and then tolerating Japanese recalcitrance,
procrastination and evasion by sending mixed signals as to
Tokyo's strategic importance to the U.S. If productive,
mutually supportive U.S. -Japan relations are to be preserved
in the post-Cold War international environment, the most
important aspect of the relationship must be the economic
element--where the core interests increasingly lie. How-
ever, the advancement, if not the very preservation, of this
element is seriously jeopardized by the continued American
adherence to Cold War era strategic assumptions and priori-
ties. The U.S. will continue to experience difficulty in
resolving divisive trade issues as long as the perception
persists that strategic imperatives will ultimately con-
strain American pursuit of economic interests.
C. RISKS/UNCERTAINTIES
The conclusions of this thesis and the policy recom-
mendations derived from them assume certain continuities in
current domestic and international trends. Should any of
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the following significant discontinuities occur, the
resulting uncertainties would introduce new risks which
could invalidate some or all of the conclusions and
recommendations presented above:
1. Threatening Soviet Instability or Renewed Hostility
Instability in the Soviet Union resulting in civil
war or the seizure of power by extremists of the left or
right with hostile views of the West might justify the
continued subordination of economic interests to security
imperatives. Although a return to Cold War military
tensions need not develop, uncertainty or open political
hostility could be enough to force a re-emphasis on
military-strategic concerns by the U.S. and its allies.
2. Rapid Growth of Chauvinistic Japanese Nationalism
A rapid growth in Japanese chauvinism possibly
resulting in the election of an openly nationalistic govern-
ment could lead to confrontation between Japan and the U.S.
over economic issues as well as the removal of American
forces from Japan. Such a government would likely plot a
more independent and assertive course for Japan, might
accelerate rearmament, would aggressively pursue narrow
national interests, and might be willing to use technology
and financial leverage to achieve its aims. It would not be




3. Shift to Openly Protectionist Policies by the U.S.
Election of a pro-protectionism candidate to the
U.S. presidency or a large majority to the U.S. Congress
could seriously impact U.S-Japan relations. While this
scenario might support rather than undercut certain
conclusions and recommendations presented in this thesis, it
risks driving the Japanese toward scenario two above. The
worst case outcome of a combination of scenarios two and
three would be a trade war detrimental to both countries'
interests
.
4. Sharp Worsening of Current Economic Trends
The sharp worsening of negative trends or other
divisive aspects of the U.S. -Japan economic balance would
add further fuel to fears of the Japanese threat and calls
for retaliation. If the U.S. government persisted in its
emphasis on Japan's strategic value, to the detriment of
American economic interests, the intensifying conflict in
U.S. views of Japan, described earlier, could result in
acrimonious debate on both sides of the Pacific and ulti-
mately a breakdown in relations. This is turn could set




While each of these scenarios is possible, all but
the first might be avoided by pursuing the recommendations
proposed in this thesis. Indeed, a mutually beneficial
U.S. -Japan relationship can be built on the realization
170
that the strategic assumptions underlying the relationship
have changed and that divisive economic issues can now be
addressed directly. Japan is no longer as strategically
important to the U.S. as it was during the Cold War--it is
the economic relationship which most closely binds the two
nation's interests today. Thus, continuing to emphasize
strategic imperatives while economic tensions fester
threatens to undercut the element of the relationship that
presents the greatest potential for cooperation in the
post-Cold War world.
Clearly, U.S. -Japan economic relations will, indeed
should, remain highly competitive and even at times conten-
tious. Healthy, dynamic competition benefits both nations.
However, this competition must be reciprocal and mutually
beneficial, not unbalanced and divisive. Similarly, while
the strategic importance of the U.S. -Japan relationship is
diminishing in the post-Cold War period, the two nations
retain significant common interests which provide grounds
for continued strategic cooperation. Both have a strong
stake in maintaining regional and global stability, for
instance, even if they often have different concepts of the
best means to promote it. However, based on a more balanced
consideration of economic and strategic interests demanded
by the unfolding post-Cold War international environment,
the United States must increase the priority given to
economic imperatives while reducing emphasis on the
171
strategic elements of American- Japanese relations. Indeed,
placing economic interests above strategic considerations
may be the key to constructing a more stable, equitable and
enduring U.S. -Japan relationship.
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